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Summary 
Time is an elemental dimension of human perception, cognition and action. Perceiving 
time is essential for everyday activities and survival. Given such importance, innumerable 
studies have investigated the perception of time over the last 100 years, but the 
computational basis for the processing of temporal information remains unknown. This 
thesis aims to understand the mechanisms underlying the perceived timing of stimuli. We 
propose a novel Bayesian model of when stimuli are perceived, that is consistent with the 
predictive coding framework – such a perspective to how the brain deals with temporal 
information forms the core of this thesis. We theorize that that the brain takes prior 
expectations about when a stimulus might occur in the future (prior distribution) and 
combines it with current sensory evidence (likelihood function) in order to generate a 
percept of perceived timing (posterior distribution).  
In Chapter 1, I will present a brief history of research and the methods used in time 
perception. I will then discuss the psychophysical approach to time, before discussing 
extant models of time perception and advancing inconsistencies between each account that 
this thesis aims to bridge the gap between. Further, I will introduce how time in the brain 
has been modelled using Bayesian Decision Theory. In Chapters 2-4, we use human 
psychophysics (experimental methods to quantify behaviour in the perceptual system) to 
show that the brain may bias perception to make slightly irregularly timed stimuli be 
reported as more regular.  
To explain our findings, in Chapter 2 we advance a Bayesian model of perceived 
timing of individual stimuli. We suggest that the brain uses temporal expectations to bias 
perception in a way that slightly earlier or later than expected stimuli are perceived closer 
to expectation. Critically, our model shows that regularly timed stimuli are perceptually 
 xiii 
accelerated and thus moved away from expectation. The key to being able to explain this 
effect is by relaxing the assumption of normality that is employed in models of time 
perception – as the processing of time is necessarily bound by its anisotropy. In Chapter 3, 
we show how an environment of irregularity can cause regularly timed sequences to be 
perceived as irregular whilst Chapter 4 shows how a change in the reliability of a signal 
can cause an increased attraction towards expectation. Then, in Chapter 5, I will 
summarize our work and then present an outlook for how our model can advance future 
research in temporal perception.
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Chapter 1 General Introduction 
Time is a fundamental variable that pervades all sensory, motor and cognitive processes. 
Organisms, such as human beings, must quantify time in order to survive and interact with 
the environment efficiently and successfully. Time is central to our everyday lives, from 
playing sports, speaking, dancing, singing, or playing music – to our sleep-wake cycle. 
Though an important dimension of perception, a slight unease may fill the reader when 
researchers refer to ‘time perception’. The fields of colour, object, taste, olfactory, 
distance, speech and depth perception all investigate tangible physical properties, whereas 
the dimension of time is invisible and transient – in fact, one could ask whether time even 
exists at all – as the theories of relativity suggest that all moments in the past, present and 
future are equally real – rendering the specious present something of an illusion 
(Callender, 2010; Davies, 2002; Einstein, 1916; James, 1890). 
1.1.1 Scales of Time 
In contrast to senses such light that we can only perceive a limited spectrum of, time is 
perceived over a broad scale from microseconds to circadian rhythms. Circadian rhythms 
are based on 24-hour light/dark cycle due to the movement of the Earth in relation to the 
Sun, which helps control waking times, sleep times and metabolic fitness (Buhusi & Meck, 
2005; Czeisler et al., 1999). At the millisecond range, time is critical for speech generation 
(Schirmer, 2004), recognition (Mauk & Buonomano, 2004) and motor control (Edwards, 
Alder, & Rose, 2002); whilst at the interval range, time is crucial for foraging behaviour 
(Henderson, Hurly, Bateson, & Healy, 2006; Meck, 2003), decision making (Brody, 
Hernández, Zainos, & Romo, 2003), sequential actions (Bortoletto, Cook, & Cunnington, 
2011) and associative learning (Gallistel & Gibbon, 2000), and has been demonstrated in 
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many species of non-human animals, such as birds (Bateson & Kacelnik, 1997; Buhusi, 
Sasaki, & Meck, 2002; Henderson et al., 2006; Ohyama, Gibbon, Deich, & Balsam, 1999), 
rodents (Buhusi et al., 2002; Gallistel, King, & McDonald, 2004), fish (Drew, Zupan, 
Cooke, Couvillon, & Balsam, 2005), primates (Gribova, Donchin, Bergman, Vaadia, & de 
Oliveira, 2002; Janssen & Shadlen, 2005) as well as in human infants (Brannon, Roussel, 
Meck, & Woldorff, 2004) and adults (Church & Deluty, 1977; Gibbon, Church, & Meck, 
1984). 
 Millisecond, interval and circadian scales are believed to have different (or 
competing) computational or neural mechanisms underpinning them (Buhusi & Meck, 
2005; Ivry & Schlerf, 2008; Merchant & de Lafuente, 2014). This thesis focuses on human 
behaviour and perception in the hundreds of milliseconds scale and as such I will later 
describe historical accounts of how the brain may deal with interval timing on such a scale. 
‘Timing’ can mean both how long an event lasted (the duration of an interval delimited by 
two stimuli), or conversely, when an event transpired (Merchant & de Lafuente, 2014). All 
of the extant models of temporal perception are concerned with how long the perceived 
duration between two events is. The central aim of this thesis, however, is to elucidate how 
the brain may estimate when an event occurred in the world. I will firstly discuss the 
methods employed in time perception research before describing how current models can 
explain temporal processing. I will then introduce recent research that suggests the brain 
uses a Bayesian inferential processing approach to estimate interval timing. 
1.2 General Methods in Time Perception 
If a mechanism for time perception exists in the brain – what should it do? One might 
argue that an optimal mechanism would try to perceive time as close to veridical (physical) 
time as possible. Thus, the two main dependent variables in time perception research 
historically concern the mean accuracy and variability of temporal estimates. Estimates of 
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a temporal characteristic, such as the duration of an event, are prone to temporal 
distortions by stimulus properties (Horr & Di Luca, 2015a; 2015b; Thomas & Brown, 
1974; Wearden, Norton, Martin, & Montford-Bebb, 2007), complexity (Schiffman & 
Bobko, 1977), sensory modality (Goldstone & Lhamon, 1974; Wearden, Edwards, Fakhri, 
& Percival, 1998; Wearden, Todd, & Jones, 2006), and context (Dyjas & Ulrich, 2014); 
and as such, the mean accuracy of an estimate deviates from real time. Whilst the mean 
accuracy may approximate real time, the system may be poor and as such the variability in 
the system may sometimes lead to experiencing an event as shorter or longer than the 
physical duration (Grondin, 2010). Thus, some researchers are concerned with measuring 
and reducing the variability in temporal estimates which has been classically researched 
using finger tapping (see, Repp, 2005; Repp & Su, 2013, for a review). 
1.2.1 Prospective or Retrospective Tasks? 
An explicit distinction exists between prospective and retrospective timing tasks (Block & 
Zakay, 1997; Brown & Stubbs, 1988; 1992; Tobin, Bisson, & Grondin, 2010). 
Historically, prospective timing tasks involve the subject knowing that the experiment or 
trial is explicitly about timing – an example of which is asking a participant to determine 
the temporal order between two stimuli. Conversely, in retrospective timing tasks, the 
subject is not aware that the experiment is about time. For example, a subject may watch a 
video or listen to a series of events, but only after the task will a temporal judgment be 
made, such as ‘how much time passed watching the video?’. 
Though it may be argued that retrospective timing tasks are more ecologically valid – 
as we rarely monitor the timing or duration of events at each moment in time – 
retrospective timing tasks are considered to involve memory-based aspects of cognition 
whereas prospective timing tasks are grounded more in the perceptual processes 
concerning the millisecond to second range of time, and as such are less affected by 
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higher-order processing (Brown & Stubbs, 1988; Grondin, 2010). The experimental work 
in this thesis deals with prospective timing tasks as it allows a purer method of 
investigation into the perception of when an event occurred, as well as being less corrupted 
by higher-order processing. 
1.2.2 Traditional Methods of Investigation 
Traditionally, psychologists have mainly used four methods to investigate the perception 
of time – but explicitly to study duration perception (Bindra & Waksberg, 1956; Block & 
Gruber, 2014; Grondin, 2010; Hancock & Block, 2012; Wallace & Rabin, 1960; Zakay, 
1993). The first two tasks involve producing or reproducing a target interval (Goldstone, 
1968). In a temporal reproduction task, a participant is asked to reproduce the duration of 
a continuous or delimited interval, whereas in a production task, an investigator tells the 
participant to push a button when the target interval has been reproduced or tap twice to 
mark the start and end of the interval. The third method is verbal estimation, where a target 
interval is presented to a participant and they are subsequently required to report in 
seconds or minutes the length of this duration (Vierordt, 1868). 
The fourth method, the method of comparison, requires participants to respond 
whether a standard or comparison interval is shorter (or longer) than the other. In general, 
the standard interval remains constant over the experiment but the comparison interval 
changes in duration from trial-to-trial though the intervals are either delimited by a 
stimulus (empty intervals), but could also be continuous (filled interval) sounds or flashes 
(Bald, Berrien, Price, & Sprague, 1942; Dinnerstein & Zlotogura, 1968; Hamlin, 1895; 
Höring, 1864; Spence, Shore, & Klein, 2001; Zampini, Shore, & Spence, 2003). Using this 
method, some studies have highlighted how temporal characteristics of the experiment can 
reliably change perception. For example, if the first interval of two empty intervals is very 
brief (< 250ms) and the temporal distance between them is less than 100ms, then the 
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second interval is perceived as being much shorter than the first (Arao, Suetomi, & 
Nakajima, 2000). This effect, the time-shrinking illusion, is an illusion of time like another 
reported effect – the filled duration illusion – where filled intervals are perceived longer 
than empty ones (Adams, 1977; Buffardi, 1971; Horr & Di Luca, 2015a; Thomas & 
Brown, 1974; Wearden et al., 2007). Participants may also be asked to report whether the 
final (comparison) interval in a sequence of more than one standard interval is perceived to 
be shorter or longer. In this methodology, it has been observed that the ability to 
discriminate the durations increases as a function of the amount of stimuli in a sequence 
(Drake & Botte, 1993; ten Hoopen, Van Den Berg, Memelink, Bocanegra, & Boon, 2011; 
Miller & McAuley, 2005). 
In the forced-choice version of the method of comparison, the standard interval is 
presented first and followed by the comparison interval (or vice versa), but the participant 
must always respond whether the comparison stimulus was either shorter or longer than 
the standard (a Two-Alternative-Forced-Choice, 2AFC) – even if the participant perceives 
the two intervals as being the same duration. Interestingly, it has been advocated that 
duration discrimination performance – the ability to successfully differentiate whether the 
standard or comparison is longer – is better when the standard is presented first (Dyjas & 
Ulrich, 2014; Grondin & McAuley, 2009; Lapid, Ulrich, & Rammsayer, 2008). 
1.2.3 From Perceived Duration to Perceived Timing 
To this point, I have described several methods of psychological inquiry that seek to 
understand how the brain may perceive time. Temporal reproduction and production, 
verbal estimation and the method of comparison have been used classically to assess the 
perceived duration of events. The method of comparison involves discriminating whether a 
standard interval is shorter or longer in duration than a comparison interval. Of central 
interest to this thesis, is the perception of when an event occurs rather than how long an 
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event lasts. In order to understand how we could measure the perceived timing of a 
stimulus, I will briefly introduce the reader to psychophysics and how the method of 
comparison can be used to estimate when a stimulus is perceived. 
1.3 Perceived Timing & Psychophysics 
1.3.1 Psychophysical Methods 
Psychophysics is the scientific investigation of the functional interrelations between the 
physical and phenomenal world (W. H. Ehrenstein & Ehrenstein, 1999; Fechner, 1860). 
The aim of psychophysics is to quantify and measure subjective experience by determining 
the relationship between perception and physical stimuli. Such as in the method of 
comparison outlined above, a central tenet of modern psychophysics is to control and vary 
the properties of an external stimulus and then ask a participant to report what they have 
experienced – with as simple a question as possible. For example, one may be interested in 
the detection of whether a sound is present or not (i.e. did you hear that stimulus?) or, 
further, in identifying what kind of stimulus characteristic is present (i.e. where was the 
stimulus). As such we can translate detection into the sensing of a stimulus – and 
identification as a higher-level process that can sometimes result in a failure to identify a 
stimulus. For example, if a stimulus is weak and noisy, it may be sensed but a participant 
may be unable to identify or report a characteristic associated with it. To understand this 
sort of effect, Psychophysicists may ask a participant to report when they can hear an 
auditory stimulus under different levels of background noise. This task is one of 
discrimination –where participants must determine whether what they are experiencing is 
noise, or whether there is a signal present (W. H. Ehrenstein & Ehrenstein, 1999). 
The method of comparison is the psychophysical methodology that is most suitable to 
assess the perceived timing of events. By presenting two signals separated by varying 
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stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) and consequently asking a participant to make a 
judgement about some characteristic or relationship between the two stimuli, such as, for 
example, ‘were the stimuli simultaneous?’ or, ‘which stimulus was first?’, it is possible to 
determine the point at which stimuli are perceived as being simultaneous – that is, their 
relative perceived timing. I will now briefly introduce the notion of synchrony and 
temporal order between the senses before introducing contemporary models of how the 
brain may deal with time perception. 
1.3.2 Intersensory Synchrony and Temporal Order   
We live in a multisensory environment where perception is not simultaneous – it takes 
time. The perception of synchrony or temporal order is not straightforward, as differences 
in neural and physical transmission times can cause synchronous events to be perceived as 
asynchronous, and vice versa. When a distant bolt of lightning illuminates the sky at night 
and sends out thunderous sound waves, we see the light first and then hear the sound even 
though both signals were emitted simultaneously. The discrepancy in the perception of a 
simultaneous multisensory event is due to the relative differences in sensory registration to 
the eyes and ears as light travels much quicker than sound (300,000,000 vs. 330 metres per 
second). To complicate matters further, the processing time for visual stimuli (approx. 
50ms) is longer than auditory stimuli (approx. 10ms) as the chemical transduction of light 
in the retina is slower than the mechanical transduction of sound waves in the ear (Allison, 
Matsumiya, Goff, & Goff, 1977; A. J. King, 2005; Spence & Squire, 2003; Vroomen & 
Keetels, 2010). The distance at which the differences in neural and physical transmission 
times are negated and signals arrive at the primary sensory cortices synchronously is 
around 10-15 metres away from the observer and has been called the horizon of 
simultaneity (Spence & Squire, 2003; Vroomen & Keetels, 2010). However, in 
interactions between a human observer and a sound/light emitting device at a close 
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distance (~1-3 metres), it has been commonly reported that visual signals have to precede 
auditory signals for the perception of simultaneity (Vroomen & Keetels, 2010; Zampini et 
al., 2003; Zampini, Guest, Shore, & Spence, 2005a; Zampini, Shore, & Spence, 2005b). 
The temporal difference between the senses is measured by finding the asynchrony 
necessary to perceive simultaneity, which is defined as the Point of Subjective Simultaneity 
(PSS). To measure this difference, one can use the psychophysical methodology. An 
extension of simply discriminating whether a signal is present or not, is to present two 
stimuli (X and Y) with varying SOAs (X-Y) and force participants to report whether the two 
stimuli are simultaneous (Exner, 1875; Fujisaki, Shimojo, Kashino, & Nishida, 2004; 
Spence et al., 2001; Zampini, Guest, Shore, & Spence, 2005a; Zampini, Shore, & Spence, 
2005b), or to report the temporal order of the pair (Boenke, Deliano, & Ohl, 2009; Gibbon 
& Rutschmann, 1969; Jaśkowski, 1992; Yamamoto & Kitazawa, 2001; Zampini et al., 
2003). 
In the Simultaneity Judgment (SJ) task, participants judge whether X and Y appear 
to be simultaneous – or not. Here, the proportions of ‘simultaneous’ responses are plotted 
as a function of SOA, which usually results in a Gaussian/Bell shaped curve where the 
PSS is taken as the peak of the distribution. Here, the assumption is that the peak 
represents perceived simultaneity, as this is the point at which participants are maximally 
sure that X and Y are synchronous. A further measure than can be derived from such a 
function is the standard deviation (SD) of the distribution of responses. As such, it 
characterizes a window of temporal integration, as it represents the range of SOAs at 
which X and Y are considered as belonging to the same event (Vroomen & Keetels, 2010). 
In temporal order judgments (TOJs), the proportion of ‘Y first’ responses is 
generally an increasing function of SOA. One usually obtains a sigmoid function where 
the PSS corresponds to the SOA at which an observer is maximally unsure about the 
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temporal order of the pair of stimuli (50% point). The steepness of the curve at the PSS 
reflects an observers’ sensitivity to temporal order and is expressed as the Just-Noticeable 
Difference (JND). Generally this measure is taken as half of the difference between the 
SOA at the 25% and 75% points, however other methods such as the Spearman-Kärber 
may calculate this based on the 14% and 86% points (two sigma; see Miller & Ulrich, 
2001). As such, the JND represents the smallest SOA an observer can reliably judge the 
temporal order thereof. A flat curve would result in a relatively larger JND and as such 
reflect an observer that has low temporal sensitivity whereas a steep curve would 
constitute a smaller JND and thus implies an observer has higher temporal sensitivity. 
1.3.3 Estimating Perceived Timing using Psychophysics 
I have discussed the psychophysical method and how one can measure the relative timing 
between two sensory events. In this thesis, I will use psychophysics to estimate the 
perceived timing of an event through the PSS. However, the PSS is only really a measure 
of the relative asynchrony in the time it takes it process two signals to be perceived as 
simultaneous – not when an event happened. To measure the perceived timing of a 
stimulus, we present a sequence of regularly timed stimuli and pair the last stimulus with a 
stimulus from another modality (which is unaffected by the sequence) to compare the PSS 
for stimuli presented on time, earlier than and later than expected. Presently, models of 
time perception do not predict that the PSS should change regardless of when a stimulus is 
presented. In the next section I will discuss such models and their predictions before 
introducing our Bayesian model of perceived timing that makes explicit predictions that 
will be tested in Chapters 2-4.  
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1.4 Contemporary Models of Time Perception 
The aim of this thesis is to understand the computational mechanisms of how the brain 
may estimate the perceived timing of events – that is, how can the brain know when is 
now, when was then and when is next? Extant models of time perception are 
fundamentally based on the notion of perceived duration – that is, how the brain may 
represent and encode the time between two signals. I will now introduce and discuss such 
contemporary models of interval timing. Firstly, it should be addressed however, that there 
exists a great literature on different taxonomies of timing models – where some 
researchers have conceptualised models of time in terms of having a dedicated neural 
mechanism for the perception of time (Creelman, 1962; Gibbon, 1977; Gibbon et al., 
1984; Treisman, 1963; Wing & Kristofferson, 1973), in contrast to time being an intrinsic 
product of sensory information processing, where recurrent spatial or activity patterns read 
out duration without the need of an internal clock (Buonomano, 2009; Buonomano & 
Merzenich, 1995; Karmarkar & Buonomano, 2007; Mauk & Buonomano, 2004). Further, 
dedicated models assume that there are specialized brain regions involved in the 
representation of temporal information, whilst intrinsic models primarily argue for a 
distributed timing mechanism over the brain (Ivry & Schlerf, 2008). The most notable 
neural instantiation of such a specialized-timing view, is the cerebellar timing hypothesis 
(Ivry, Spencer, Zelaznik, & Diedrichsen, 2002). The cerebellum has been implicated in the 
representation of time, as patients with cerebellar pathology have relatively poor 
performance on tasks that involve simply judging the duration between two auditory tones 
(Ivry & Keele, 1989; Mangels, Ivry, & Shimizu, 1998). In contrast, temporal information 
can be understood as the result of activity across a network of cortical regions (Lewis & 
Miall, 2003). However, this thesis is concerned with two popular classes of dedicated 
models for the perception of time: Entrainment and interval models (Gibbon et al., 1984; 
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Large & Jones, 1999; McAuley & Jones, 2003), and as such, I will now introduce both 
before showing how they can be formulated to make predictions about the timing of 
individual stimuli. 
1.4.1 Interval Models  
When one is asked ‘what time is it?’ or ‘how long have you been waiting?’ – it is quite 
likely that this person will glance at their watch and use it to estimate what the present 
time is – or how long the wait has been. As such, it is intuitive to think that the brain may 
use a clock-like mechanism in order to deal with the perception of time. Interval models of 
timing are born out of this analogy and they conceive time as a triad of clock, memory and 
decision processes (Creelman, 1962; Treisman, 1963). The most notable, and influential 
interval model is Scalar Expectancy Theory (SET; Church, Meck, & Gibbon, 1994; 
Gibbon, 1977; Gibbon et al., 1984). In the SET model, the internal clock is considered as a 
pacemaker-accumulator mechanism, where a dedicated pacemaker emits pulses 
continuously. To represent duration, the accumulator counts the amount of pulses between 
two signals and then stores them in memory (Figure 1.1). The hallmark of the SET model 
is that as the mean duration of an interval increases, the associated standard deviation of 
the duration estimate increases linearly also – this is often called the ‘scalar property’ of 
interval timing. The scalar property is synonymous with the Weber-Fechner Law (Fechner, 
1860), which asserts a logarithmic relationship between physical magnitudes and the 
representation in the perceptual system, and as such, the JND between two physical 
magnitudes is proportional to the absolute physical magnitude. Each interval is maintained 
in working memory before being passed to a more robust representation in long-term 
memory. The key point here is that time, in these accounts, is represented as discrete 
interval durations that are subsequently compared with other intervals at a decision stage 
(Allman, Teki, Griffiths, & Meck, 2013; Church & Broadbent, 1990; Gibbon et al., 1984). 
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If the amount of pulses in one interval is greater than another – then the former interval is 
perceived to be longer. After sufficient exposure to repeated intervals, the representation of 
the interval in memory becomes more refined and leads to better discrimination 
performance (Drake & Botte, 1993; ten Hoopen et al., 2011; Miller & McAuley, 2005; 
Schulze, 1978; 1989). Further, the stored intervals can be compared to the current clock 
reading in order to estimate the onset of a future stimulus.  
 
Figure 1.1. Schematics of the internal clock model of Scalar Expectancy Theory (SET) and a Bayesian 
inference approach to duration estimation. The left panel illustrates the Scalar Expectancy Theory of duration 
perception. The right panel shows how a Bayesian inference approach to duration estimation may be 
reconciled with SET (Shi et al., 2013). Sensed evidence (likelihood) is determined from the clock stage of 
the stage of SET. The prior represents the previous knowledge of previously exposed durations. The 
posterior is the combination of the prior and likelihood, resulting in an estimation of the duration of an 
interval. 
 
The SET model does not try to explain any changes in the perceived timing of 
individual stimuli – rather, it is concerned with changes in the representation of duration. 
Stimuli, in this sense are external cues that – after a processing delay – simply delimit 
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intervals. The interval models are also symmetric in the sense that they do not predict any 
differences in the detection of temporal irregularities due to the anisochrony a stimulus is 
presented. For example, if a stimulus is presented earlier than expected – then there should 
be no difference in the discrimination of its irregularity compared to a stimulus presented 
later than expected (Drake & Botte, 1993; ten Hoopen et al., 2011; Miller & McAuley, 
2005). We test the predictions of interval models in Chapter 2, where we find that, 
contrary to current belief, that there is a difference in performance of the detection of 
irregularity due to the anisochrony at which a stimulus is presented. Further, we find 
differences in the perceived timing of stimuli as a function of their relation to expectation 
– early stimuli are perceptually delayed whilst late stimuli are perceptually accelerated in 
order to appear closer to expectation. Interestingly, we find that stimuli presented 
isochronously (on-time) are also perceptually accelerated. Interval models of time 
perception cannot account for these patterns of results however entrainment models can be 
formulated to explain only the acceleration of stimuli presented isochronously. 
1.4.2 Entrainment Models 
Entrainment models offer an alternative realisation of interval timing.  Similar to interval 
models, the basic tenet of these models is that a dedicated pacemaker is an entrainable 
oscillator that peaks in amplitude at the expected onset of future stimuli (Large & Jones, 
1999; Large & Palmer, 2002; Large & Snyder, 2009; McAuley & Jones, 2003) – though 
phase coincidence (Miall, 1989), or the recurrence of activity patterns (Buonomano, 2009; 
Buonomano & Merzenich, 1995; Karmarkar & Buonomano, 2007) have also been 
proposed as alternative intrinsic entrainment models. Whilst interval models have mainly 
been formulated to explain interval timing and determining which of two intervals is 
longer (or shorter) – entrainment models are more conducive to also explain stimulus 
 14 
timing in rhythmic sequences – as internal oscillations gradually adjust to the phase of 
external rhythms.  
A prominent entrainment-based model of how the brain deals with rhythmic 
sequences is Dynamic Attending Theory (DAT) (Jones & Boltz, 1989; Large & Jones, 
1999; Large & Palmer, 2002). Here, attention is not distributed evenly over time, but 
rather ebbs and flows with time’s passing. Originally proposed as a model of rhythmic 
expectancy, DAT proposes that rhythm perception is induced by way of entrainment to 
external signals. Internal fluctuations in attentional energy (attentional ‘peaks’) generate 
temporal expectancies about the onset of future events that can acclimate to the period and 
phase of external events by way of an adaptive internal oscillator (Figure 1.2). At the 
neural level, the perception of regular events has been proposed to originate from neural 
oscillations that adjust and resonate with external signals (Henry & Herrmann, 2014; 
Large & Snyder, 2009; Zanto, Snyder, & Large, 2006). The framework of active sensing 
(Schroeder & Lakatos, 2009; Schroeder, Wilson, Radman, Scharfman, & Lakatos, 2010) –
the fluctuation of excitation/inhibition cycles– can be tied directly to DAT. The high 
excitability phase of neural oscillations are thought to be associated with the peak of the 
attentional pulse and as such facilitate sensory selection and processing of stimuli that 
coincide with the peak of an oscillation (Henry & Herrmann, 2014; Lakatos, Karmos, 
Mehta, Ulbert, & Schroeder, 2008). Therefore, one can reason that if a stimulus occurs at 
the peak of an oscillation and high excitability phase, then it should be given a perceptual 
boost and processed faster. This effect, is similar to prior entry (Spence & Parise, 2010; 
Sternberg, Knoll, & Gates, 1971), where attended stimuli are processed quicker than 
unattended ones. The idea of prioritized processing of attended stimuli exists in the visual 
cognition domain (Summerfield & Egner, 2009), and such attentional facilitation of 
perception has been highlighted in a number of studies in the temporal processing 
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literature (Spence et al., 2001; Sternberg & Knoll, 1973; Zampini, Shore, & Spence, 
2005b) as well as at the neural level (J. J. J. McDonald, Teder-Sälejärvi, Di Russo, & 
Hillyard, 2005).  
DAT accounts for perceived stimulus timing by considering that humans detect 
asynchronies between an expected stimulus onset time and the actual stimulus onset time 
(McAuley, 1995). If the stimulus onset occurs after the expected peak then a stimulus is 
perceived as being late whilst if it is before the expected peak then it is perceived as being 
early. Intuitively, when a stimulus onset time coincides with the peak of the expected time, 
then it is perceived as being on time – though as shown above, entrainment models could 
be formulated to predict an acceleration of attended-to stimuli that occur at the peak of an 
oscillation.  As a consequence of increasing attentional expectancies due to entrainment, 
sensitivity to temporal deviations improves as a function of increasing sequence length 
(Barnes & Jones, 2000; Drake & Botte, 1993; McAuley & Kidd, 1998; Miller & McAuley, 
2005). 
 
Figure 1.2. A schematic overview of Dynamic Attending Theory. An adaptive internal oscillator is a 
dynamic system that periodically generates temporal expectancies (Jones & Boltz, 1989; Large & Jones, 
1999; Large & Palmer, 2002). The oscillations coupled with pulses of attentional energy at (recurrent) 
expected time points, given the phase of a rhythm, result in attention being allocated at the expected time-
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point. Discrepancies between he onset times of a stimulus in relation to its expected onset gives rise to the 
detection of temporal irregularities.   
 
Extant Bayesian models of time perception have been formulated (Jazayeri & 
Shadlen, 2010; Miyazaki, Nozaki, & Nakajima, 2005; Shi, Church, & Meck, 2013) – but 
only for the representation of interval duration. I will now introduce the idea of Bayesian 
time perception for duration perception before briefly giving an overview of our proposal 
of a Bayesian account of perceived timing. 
1.4.3 A Bayesian Model of Interval Timing 
As mentioned previously, time is subject to various contextual distortions. A seminal 
example of contextual calibration is Vierordt’s law (Lejeune & Wearden, 2009; Vierordt, 
1868). When observers are presented with various intervals of different lengths and 
subsequently asked to reproduce each interval – they tend to overestimate the duration of 
short intervals, and underestimate long ones. This is a type of ‘central-tendency’ effect – 
participants migrate their estimates of duration towards the mean of exposed intervals. A 
prevalent model of such an effect is that the perception of interval duration is derived from 
not only the perception of current sensory information, but also from the prior knowledge 
of the duration of previously exposed intervals (Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010; Lejeune & 
Wearden, 2009; Petzschner & Glasauer, 2011; Petzschner, Glasauer, & Stephan, 2015; 
Taatgen & van Rijn, 2011). Prior knowledge of the temporal statistics of the environment, 
in this sense, biases temporal perception.  
 A suitable candidate to explain the central-tendency effect observed in time 
perception is the Bayesian framework (Bayes, 1763). Bayesian models of perception have 
been successfully used to model several perceptual domains (Ernst, 2006; Ernst & Banks, 
2002; Ernst & Bülthoff, 2004; Knill, 2007; Knill & Richards, 1996; Maloney & 
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Mamassian, 2009; Mamassian, Landy, & Maloney, 2002) and have been applied to 
duration estimation (Hartcher-O'Brien, Di Luca, & Ernst, 2014; Shi et al., 2013) and 
reproduction (Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010; Miyazaki et al., 2005). In the Bayesian 
framework, a generative model combines current sensory information (likelihood) with a 
priori knowledge of the world (prior) in order to give rise to a percept (posterior). The 
likelihood and prior in this model are weighted by their relative uncertainties (Colas, 
Diard, & Bessiere, 2010; Fernandes, Stevenson, Vilares, & Körding, 2014; Griffiths & 
Tenenbaum, 2011; Lucas & Griffiths, 2009; Vilares & Körding, 2011). 
 The Bayesian framework has recently been applied to the SET model of interval 
timing (Shi et al., 2013). The central tenet of such a Bayesian model of interval timing is 
that the triad of components of the SET model are translated into the Bayesian framework: 
the likelihood, prior and posterior are considered analogous to the clock, memory and 
decision stages (Figure 1.1). The clock stage represents the likelihood function, and is 
rendered as such: if an interval delimited by two stimuli is duration D, with an allied 
internal clock count of C, which represents the number of ‘ticks’ accumulated by the time 
the second stimulus has delimited the interval, then the likelihood function 𝑃! 𝐶   𝐷), is the 
probability of acquiring the perceived duration C, given the external stimulation D. The 
width of the likelihood probability distribution indicates the relative sensory uncertainty 
given the measurement – a steep function, for instance, would give a likelihood function 
with little uncertainty about the duration observed D, whilst a flatter function would 
indicate a likelihood function with great uncertainty about D. 
 The memory stage is analogous to the prior probability distribution 𝑃!(𝐷). 
Sensory estimates from the likelihood update the prior so to represent the distribution of 
learned intervals. In order to arrive at an estimate of perceived duration, according to 
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Bayes’ rule, the prior is combined with the likelihood, in order to form the posterior 
distribution 𝑃!(𝐷|𝐶): 
 𝑃! 𝐷     𝐶 =   𝑃! 𝐶     𝐷)    ∙   𝑃!(𝐷)  (Eq. 1.1) 
The posterior distribution is considered as synonymous to the memory stage of the SET 
model. Given the posterior, a Bayesian ideal observer chooses an action given a loss 
function that specifies the relative cost or success of a potential behavioural response 
(Acerbi, Vijayakumar, & Wolpert, 2014; Acerbi, Wolpert, & Vijayakumar, 2012; Körding 
& Wolpert, 2004; Wolpert, 2007). The model predicts noisy sensory estimates of duration 
are biased towards the mean of the prior probability distribution.  
1.4.4 Summary of Models 
In summary, interval models of duration perception are based on the idea that an internal 
clock keeps track of time by counting the amount of pulses between the onsets of one 
event to another. When considering the perceived timing of a single stimulus, these models 
make no predictions about changes in the timing of a stimulus due to its anisochrony. 
Entrainment models, on the other hand, can be formulated to predict that expected stimuli 
are processed faster and as such, perceived earlier. In contrast to these accounts of time 
perception, the Bayesian framework has been applied to several perceptual domains, and 
has recently been applied to duration estimation (Hartcher-O'Brien et al., 2014; Shi et al., 
2013). The Bayesian framework has been used to show how the representation of duration 
is calibrated in order to make intervals appear more similar to the duration of previously 
exposed ones (a central tendency effect). The likelihood function is similar to the clock 
stage of the SET interval-based model – the clock is responsible for the measurement stage 
of inferring the duration of an external event. The prior is akin to the long-term reference 
and memory stages of the SET model and as such represents the learned knowledge of the 
average durations experienced. The posterior distribution represents a percept and an 
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observer chooses a response after a decision rule, which is similar to the decision stage of 
the SET model. The model is useful in connecting the computational principles of 
Bayesian modelling with the information-processing account of duration perception of 
interval models. However, as with other interval-based models – the Bayesian account of 
time perception (described above) only makes predictions about what happens to the 
representation of intervals, and as such, does not predict any changes to the perceived 
timing of stimuli in sequences. 
1.5 Shifting Focus from Perceived Duration to Perceived 
Event Timing 
Interval and entrainment models were born out of modelling the perception of duration. 
Both models predict that changes in the detection of irregularity should be symmetrical – 
whether a stimulus is earlier or later than expected, there should be no difference in the 
detection of irregularity. Neither model has been formulated to deal with changes in the 
perceived timing of individual stimuli in a sequence. In the following Chapters we test 
such predictions – but also formulate our own model that moves perceived timing away 
from the representation of duration – towards the representation of event timing. We 
propose that a Bayesian inferential process happens at every point in time, where current 
sensory evidence is combined iteratively with expectations of the future timing of stimuli. 
Time, in this sense, is characterized by an on-line sensory continuum that represents each 
point in time. Such a model predicts that perceived timing is biased in a way that 
regularises slightly irregular stimuli towards the expected time point. Extant Bayesian 
models of time perception have been formulated (see Section 1.4.3;  Jazayeri & Shadlen, 
2010; Miyazaki et al., 2005; Shi et al., 2013) – but only for the representation of intervals. 
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The following Chapter (2) lays the foundation of this thesis and introduces our Bayesian 
model of perceived timing. 
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Chapter 2 A Bayesian Model of Perceived 
Timing 
In this paper, we tested if temporal expectations could bias the perceived timing of stimuli. We present four 
experiments that show how the brain may regularize stimuli presented slightly too early or too late. We 
introduce a Bayesian model of perceived timing with dynamic priors and asymmetric likelihood functions 
that explains the perceptual phenomena we observe. 
 
2.1 Abstract 
The environment has a temporal structure and knowing when a stimulus will appear 
translates into increased perceptual performance. Here, we investigated how the human 
brain exploits temporal regularity in stimulus sequences for perception. We find that the 
timing of stimuli that occasionally deviate from a regularly-paced sequence is perceptually 
distorted. Stimuli presented earlier than expected are perceptually delayed, whereas 
stimuli presented on time and later than expected are perceptually accelerated. This result 
suggests that the brain regularizes slightly deviant stimuli in a Bayesian-optimal fashion by 
combining expectations in the form of a-priori probability of encountering future stimuli 
with incoming sensory information. The asymmetry in the temporal shift, which leads to 
speedup in the processing of expected stimuli, is due to the shape of the prior probability 
distribution.  
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2.2 Introduction 
Events in our perceptual world often have a predictable temporal structure. Exploiting 
temporal regularities can decrease metabolic consumption (VanRullen & Dubois, 2011) 
and automatize behaviour for rhythmic activities such as dance, locomotion, speech, and 
music production (McNeill, 1995; Repp, 2005). Predictable timing of events leads to 
improved stimulus detection and discrimination (Brochard, Tassin, & Zagar, 2013; 
Carnevale, de Lafuente, Romo, Barak, & Parga, 2015; Correa, Lupiáñez, & Tudela, 2005; 
Cravo, Rohenkohl, Wyart, & Nobre, 2013; Escoffier, Sheng, & Schirmer, 2010; Jazayeri 
& Shadlen, 2010; Rohenkohl & Nobre, 2011), perceptual changes (Kok, Brouwer, van 
Gerven, & de Lange, 2013), and faster responses (Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010; Lakatos et al., 
2008; Miyazaki et al., 2005). The neural mechanisms behind these perceptual phenomena 
are unclear. Here we propose to use one of the simplest types of stimulus regularities, the 
occurrence of stimuli after equal intervals of time (isochrony), to quickly generate the 
expectation for a successive stimulus. We investigate how perceived timing changes due to 
such an expectation. 
There are several schools of thought about how the brain deals with the regularity of 
stimulus sequences. Interval-based models assert that the time between two stimuli is 
represented as a discrete interval duration that is compared with subsequent intervals 
(Church et al., 1994; Creelman, 1962; Gibbon, 1977; Gibbon et al., 1984; Treisman, 1963). 
The representation is refined with more stimuli presented, leading to increased 
performance (Drake & Botte, 1993; Miller & McAuley, 2005; Schulze, 1989). In contrast, 
entrainment models advocate that the phase and frequency of temporal patterns is the 
important aspect. The dynamics of attending to stimuli, for example, has been shown to 
adjusts to rhythmic external stimulation (Jones & Boltz, 1989; Large & Jones, 1999; Large 
& Palmer, 2002; Large & Snyder, 2009). At a neural level, phase coincidence (Miall, 1989) 
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and activity patterns (Buonomano & Merzenich, 1995; Karmarkar & Buonomano, 2007) 
progressively tune to the phase and frequency of rhythmic stimulus sequences. Exogenous 
attention is then deployed at the expected time (Henry & Herrmann, 2014; Rohenkohl, 
Coull, & Nobre, 2011). Interestingly, attention and expectation have opposite effects on 
neural responses, where expectation reduces neural responses (Auksztulewicz & Friston, 
2015). Such reduction is accounted for by the free energy principle (Friston, 2005; 2008), 
according to which the brain continuously predicts stimulation and thus increases in neural 
activity represent deviations from expectations. 
For all these approaches, sensitivity to temporal irregularities should increase as a 
function of the number of stimuli composing a sequence (Large & Palmer, 2002; Schulze, 
1989). Moreover, according to interval-based models, the presence of a stimulus sequence 
should not have an influence on the perceived timing of individual stimuli. Entrainment  
(Lakatos et al., 2008) and predictive coding models which are based on time-point 
representations (Friston, 2005; 2008), on the other hand, predict that expected stimuli 
could be perceived earlier than unexpected ones, a phenomenon called prior entry (Spence 
& Parise, 2010). Here we reason that if a regular sequence leads to the expectation of a 
stimulus, not only stimuli presented when expected, but also stimuli presented later on 
should be also expected and thus should be perceptually accelerated (Nobre, Correa, & 
Coull, 2007). On the contrary, several approaches have advanced that there should be no 
difference in the perceived timing of early and late stimuli (Barnes & Jones, 2000; Henry 
& Herrmann, 2014; McAuley & Jones, 2003). Here we want to disambiguate such 
predictions and characterize in which way presenting stimuli in a sequence influences 
perceived timing. 
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Extant Bayesian accounts of time perception (Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010; Shi et al., 
2013) do not account for changes in perceived timing of individual stimuli as they are 
based on the representation of intervals. We propose that a Bayesian inferential process 
happens not only at the interval level, but also at the individual stimulus timing level. 
Perception is obtained at each point in time through the iterative combination of incoming 
sensory information with expectations of a stimulus based on previous intervals. A 
fundamental aspect of our model is that – differently from what happens at the interval 
level (Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010; Shi et al., 2013) – probability distributions about timing 
are asymmetric due to the way time flows. This asymmetry explains perceptual 
acceleration of expected stimuli as a more tuned neural response with a sharp onset for 
stimuli presented at expectation. 
2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Behavioural Results: Asymmetric Temporal Deviation Detection 
In Experiment 1 participants judged whether the timing of the last stimulus in a sequence 
was regular or irregular. As one would expect, Figure 2.1C,D shows that the proportion of 
sequences reported to be regular decreases with large anisochronies, and such a pattern is 
more marked for audio sequences, reflecting the higher reliability of temporal judgments 
with auditory stimuli. As described in the literature, sensitivity to temporal deviations 
increases with longer sequences (Drake & Botte, 1993; Large & Palmer, 2002), but here 
we find that changes are accentuated for stimuli presented earlier than expected – an 
asymmetry in anisochrony detection (Figure 2.1C,D). 
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Figure 2.1. Stimuli and results of Experiment 1. Each participant is only presented with sequences of stimuli 
in one modality. (A) Example of an audio sequence with the final stimulus presented early. (B) Example of a 
visual sequence with the final stimulus late. (C) Proportion of “regular” responses as a function of the 
anisochrony of the last stimulus in an audio sequence and (D) in a visual sequence. Each line represents data 
obtained with a different sequence length. The distribution of responses is steeper with longer sequences 
(interaction term of a two-way repeated measures (r.m.) ANOVA on the inverse-normal proportion of 
“regular” responses bounded between .01 and .99; audio: F(42,588)=1.8, p=.0016, ηp²=.11; visual: 
F(42,588)=1.5, p=.0135, ηp²=.10). Asterisks denote anisochronies at which the proportions of responses 
significantly differ across the four sequence lengths (one-way r.m. ANOVA Bonferroni corrected, p<.0033). 
In all graphs, error bars represent the standard error of the mean. Supplementary Figure 2.1 shows the data of 
Experiment 1S where sequence duration was kept constant within a block of trials. In all graphs, error bars 
represent the standard error of the mean. 
2.3.2 Behavioural Results: Changes in Perceived Timing 
In order to measure whether the asymmetry in isochrony judgments is related to a change 
in the perceived timing of stimuli, in Experiment 2 we employed a novel experimental 
paradigm where the last stimulus in a 4-stimulus sequence is paired with a stimulus in 
another modality and participants reported the temporal order of this audiovisual pair 
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(Figure 2.2A). From participants’ responses we could determine the audiovisual 
asynchrony necessary for the Perception of Subjective Simultaneity (PSS). The last 
stimulus in the sequence could be presented on time or anisochronously (earlier or later 
than expected). If we assume that the sequence is more likely to exert an influence on 
stimuli of the same modality than of the other modality, then changes in PSS due to the 
anisochrony indicate a modification of the time at which the final stimulus is perceived 
(Figure 2.2B); we call this effect Bias by Expected Timing (BET). In particular, the 
comparison of PSS values obtained with audio and visual sequences suggests that if the 
last stimulus in the sequence is presented slightly earlier than expected, the BET leads to a 
later perception of the stimulus (delay). On the other hand, for the last stimulus presented 
at the expected time-point or later than expected, the BET leads to an earlier perception of 
the stimulus (acceleration). Physically synchronous audiovisual stimuli are differentially 
reported as either “sound first” or “light first” dependent on their anisochrony with the 
sequence as shown in Figure 2.3B. The BET is independent of the sequence modality 
(Figure 2.3A). We find no difference in the JND (discriminability) across conditions or 
between modalities (Figure 2.3C). 
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Figure 2.2. Stimuli and results of Experiment 2. (A) Examples of trial sequences where participants judged 
the temporal order of the audiovisual pair presented at the end of a sequence. Auditory and visual sequences 
were interleaved. Top: An audio sequence with the final stimulus presented earlier than expected (negative 
anisochrony) and with a light presented before the final audio stimulus (positive SOA). Bottom: A visual 
sequence with the final stimulus presented later than expected (positive anisochrony) and with sound 
presented before the final visual stimulus (negative SOA). (B) Average PSS values corresponding to the 
SOA at which audio and visual stimuli are perceived as being simultaneous. A positive PSS means that light 
has to be presented before the sound to be perceived as simultaneous. The difference between PSS values on 
the two curves indicates the bias by expected timing (BET): in this graph perceptual acceleration happens 
when the audio PSS is higher than the visual PSS. If there was no change in perceived timing across the 
presented anisochronies, the pattern of PSS values should be horizontal. The BET, instead, changes as a 
function of anisochrony (interaction term of a two-way r.m. ANOVA, F(4,44)=4.8, p=.0026, ηp²=.30) as 
stimuli presented at -80ms are perceptually delayed whereas stimuli presented at 0ms and +40ms are 
perceptually accelerated. The experiment has been replicated using simultaneity judgments (Supplementary 
Figure 2.2). 
Figure 2.3. Additional analysis of Experiment 2 data. (A) PSS values presented as the asynchrony between 
probe vs. last repeated stimulus (and not light versus sound as depicted in Figure 2.2A and whose results are 
shown in Figure 2.2B). The dotted line represents a PSS of 30ms between lights and sounds, which is 
reversed in sign for the visual sequence condition. The BET is evidenced as an equal distortion of the two 
curves. For example, in an isochronous auditory sequence with a physically synchronous light stimulus there 
is an increase in audio first responses, which evidences the auditory stimulus being accelerated. A two-way 
r.m. ANOVA with factors sequence modality and anisochrony evidences the difference in latency between 
audio and visual stimuli (F(1,11)=7.1, p=.022, ηp²=.39) as well as the BET effect (factor anisochrony, 
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F(4,44)=4.8, p=.0026, ηp²=.30), but no interaction (F(4,44)=.4, p=.80). (B) Proportion of “audio first” 
responses for physically synchronous audio and visual stimuli. The BET is evidenced as the difference 
between the two curves. A two-way r.m. ANOVA with factors sequence modality and anisochrony yielded 
no main effects but a significant interaction F(4,44)=4.6, p=.0033, ηp²=.30. (C) JND values. A two-way r.m. 
ANOVA with factors sequence modality and anisochrony indicates that no main effects or interaction are 
significant (all p >.3). 
2.3.3 Behavioural Results: Longer sequences and Different IOIs 
To test whether the BET depends on the number of stimuli in the sequence, in Experiment 
3 participants judged the temporal order of an audio and a visual stimulus following the 
presentation of audio sequences of different lengths (3,4, or 5 repeated stimuli presented in 
different blocks, Figure 2.4A). Results indicate that the BET increases as a function of 
sequence length (Figure 2.4B).  
Furthermore, to test whether the observed effects are due to the repeated presentation 
of the same interval across all trials, in Experiment 4 we used trial sequences with four 
stimuli each, but varying inter-onset intervals (IOIs) interleaved within a block (Figure 
2.5A). The BET is still present when stimuli having different periodicities are interleaved 
in the same experiment (Figure 2.5B). 
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Figure 2.4. Stimuli and results of Experiment 3. (A) Examples of sequences of different lengths, where the 
last audio stimulus is paired with a visual stimulus (not shown). Differently from the results of Figures 2 and 
3, here only auditory sequences have been presented. (B) PSS values for early, on time, and late stimuli 
differ significantly, confirming the BET found in Experiment 2 (factor anisochrony of a 2-way r.m. ANOVA, 
F(2,46)=7.9, p=.001, ηp²=.25). The magnitude of the BET increases with longer stimulus sequences 
(interaction of anisochrony and sequence length, F(4,92)=2.5, p=.049, ηp²=.10) and the effect is present with 
5 stimuli (one-way r.m. ANOVA, F(2,46)=10.4, p<.001, ηp²=.31), but not with 4 and 3 stimuli (F(2,46)=1.6, 
p=.22; F(2,46)=.60, p=.57). 
 
Figure 2.5.  Stimuli and results of Experiment 4. (A) Examples of sequences with an IOI of 400ms, 700ms, 
and 1000ms where the last audio stimulus was anisochronous (±40ms) and paired with a visual stimulus (not 
shown). Only auditory sequences have been presented. (B) PSS values indicate a BET similar to the other 
experiments (factor anisochrony of a 2-way r.m. ANOVA, F(1,23)=15.7, p=.0006, ηp²=.41), which suggests 
that testing the same IOI throughout the experiment is not necessary to elicit the BET and that the effect is 
not limited to one IOI. 
2.3.4 A Bayesian Model of Perceived Timing 
We model the results collected using Bayesian Decision Theory (BDT). Such a framework 
has been successfully applied to several perceptual domains (Kersten & Yuille, 2003; 
Knill & Richards, 1996; Mamassian et al., 2002; Petzschner & Glasauer, 2011; Wolpert & 
Ghahramani, 2000) including interval estimation (Hartcher-O'Brien et al., 2014; Shi et al., 
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2013) and reproduction (Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010; Miyazaki et al., 2005), but here we 
apply it for the first time to perceived timing of individual stimuli. 
To do this, we hypothesize that the brain represents the probability of experiencing 
brief events at every time point. To give an example, we can represent the timing of 
clapping sounds as the probability of perceiving a clap at any point in time (past, present, 
and future). The probability of sensing a clap increases at time points immediately 
following the time at which the clap was produced (likelihood probability, Figure 2.6A). 
The probability of encountering a clap in the future increases at regular intervals for future 
time points due to the regular timing of applauses (prior probability; Figure 2.6B). If we 
extend BDT to the time domain, the likelihood and prior probabilities should be combined 
at each time point (Eq. 2.6) leading to the posterior probability (Figure 2.6C). We will now 
examine the three components of this process – the likelihood, prior, and posterior. 
The likelihood function captures the probability of sensing a stimulus after it has 
occurred. It represents the temporal smearing due to the variability in the delay of sensory 
processing and, as such, it is akin to the impulse response function (Blommaert & Roufs, 
1987). In other applications of BDT to temporal properties, the likelihood has been 
assumed to have a Gaussian distribution over time (Hartcher-O'Brien et al., 2014; Jazayeri 
& Shadlen, 2010; Miyazaki et al., 2005; Shi et al., 2013) but here we propose a different 
shape because of the intrinsic constraints of the representation of individual stimuli over 
time. First, time flows in one direction and thus the causality of sensory processing needs 
to be directional. As such, the probability of a stimulus being sensed is more than 0 only 
after a delay due to neural processing. Thereafter, because sensory processing can only last 
a finite amount of time, the likelihood probability should return to zero (unless the 
stimulus could be missed). As in models of reaction time (Ratcliff, 1978), we describe the 
probability of sensing a stimulus at time t as a bounded accumulation of sensory evidence 
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(Eq. 2.8). Figure 2.6A shows the shape of the distributions obtained for accumulation of 
sensory evidence from audio and visual signals that graphically resembles lognormal 
distributions. If we assume that exactly one perceived onset is associated with a stimulus, 
then the probability of perceiving the stimulus at any time point sums to 1 and in this way 
we can deal with two likelihood probability distributions (instead of likelihood functions). 
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Figure 2.6. Bayesian model of perceived stimulus timing with asymmetric probability distributions (see 
Methods for details). (A) The top panel shows the likelihood probability distribution – the probability of 
sensing the stimulus presented at t=0. The distribution is obtained by the accumulation of noisy sensory 
evidence until a threshold has been reached (dotted horizontal line on lower panel) and is described by 
Equation 7. The parameters of the two distributions are obtained by fitting simple audiovisual temporal order 
judgments. It should be noted how the onset and the maximum point likelihood are not indicative of the 
processing latencies of the audio and visual signals as it would do for symmetric distributions, as the mean of 
the distribution is displaced from the mode. (B) The prior probability distribution for the next stimulus is 
obtained by combining the prior for the previous stimulus with the current posterior distribution, plus a 
constant (Methods, Eq. 2.7). (C) Combination of prior and likelihood to obtain the posterior distribution 
according to Eq. 6 for the fourth stimulus (last stimulus in Experiment 2) appearing -40 ms, 0 ms, or +40 ms 
with respect to the expected time (separate rows). Perceived timing is obtained retrospectively by 
considering the overall posterior distribution (i.e., by computing the mean of the distribution). 
In bounded accumulation models of reaction time, the parameters for the 
accumulation of sensory evidence vary due to stimulus characteristics, but also due to 
context and task conditions (Ratcliff, 1978). Here instead, we constrain the likelihood 
function not to change with identical stimuli whilst the shape of the prior probability 
distribution changes with more stimuli presented. The a-priori probability of a stimulus 
over time is modelled to be flat when the first stimulus is presented (Figure 2.6B). After 
the first stimulus occurs, the prior should not be flat any more due to the knowledge of the 
temporal statistics of the environment. To understand why, consider that if someone claps 
once, when do you expect the next clap to occur? The probability of the second stimulus 
occurring before the first one is necessarily nil: the prior starts at 0 for when the first clap 
is heard and it increases in the future. The most probable time at which you expect a 
second clap corresponds to the most frequently experienced interval between claps, 
roughly ¼ of a second (Repp, 1987). The probability of hearing a second clap then 
decreases but doesn’t quite reach 0, as hearing a clap even tomorrow is always a 
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possibility. Here we assume that the prior for the second stimulus peaks at the most 
frequent inter-onset interval used in the experiment (700 ms). 
When the hands clap for the second time, the perceptual system has an estimate of 
the duration of the interval between two successive claps. From previous experience there 
is the knowledge that subsequent intervals are likely to be similar in duration (clapping 
variability is typically 2.5% of the intervals (Repp, 1987)). Here we assume that the prior 
linking two successive interval durations is a delta function because apart from the small 
anisochrony of the last stimulus most intervals presented in each trial have the same 
duration. The interaction between the sensed duration and the prior that links two 
successive intervals is what has been modelled as the likelihood probability distribution in 
previous models of interval estimation (Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010; Miyazaki et al., 2005). 
Here instead, this prior is taking part in the formation of priors about points in time. 
Temporal expectations build up as more information is acquired. To model this, we 
update the prior probability in a way similar to a Kalman filter, by recursively integrating 
the posterior distribution of the previous stimulus into the prior (Eq. 2.7). The prior 
distribution becomes more and more similar to the asymmetric likelihood, whilst its 
maximum value does not deviate from the previously experienced intervals (Figure 2.6B). 
As the posterior is produced by the asymmetric prior and likelihood, its right side is also 
longer than the left but this asymmetry decreases at every stimulus. To model how the 
posterior probability distribution leads to perception, here we consider the whole shape of 
the probability distribution over time (i.e., as opposed to only using its maximum). The 
pattern of BETs is due to the combination of the asymmetric likelihood with the 
asymmetric prior: there is an attraction of the posterior towards the prior, but the larger 
reduction of the posterior’s right tail leads to perceptual acceleration of expected stimuli 
compared to the likelihood taken alone (Figure 2.6C middle).  
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Figure 2.7 shows the results of a simulation for the Bayesian model we propose, as 
well as the interval-based and entrainment models we have discussed in the introduction 
(see Methods for details about their implementation). The predictions of each model for 
the conditions of Experiments 1 and 2 should be compared to the experimental data 
summarized in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2B respectively. 
 
Figure 2.7. Comparison of the model predictions for Experiments 1 and 2 (see Methods for details about 
their implementations). For Experiment 1 the maximum point of each curve is normalized to 1. (A) 
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Predictions of an interval-based model obtained by fitting the multiple look model (Drake & Botte, 1993) to 
the distribution of responses. The model does not predict asymmetries in Experiment 1 or changes in 
perceived timing in Experiment 2 as it is based on representation of durations. (B) Prediction of an 
entrainment model (Large & Palmer, 2002). Detection of irregularities has been hypothesized to be 
symmetrical (Barnes & Jones, 2000; Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010; McAuley & Jones, 2003; Miyazaki et al., 
2005)  and the predictions for Experiment 1 suggest only a slight asymmetry (that is more evident in the 
visual condition). The model does not make explicit predictions about changes in perceived timing of stimuli, 
but here we show how a 15 ms prior-entry effect (Spence & Parise, 2010) proportional to the attentional 
pulse would affect the results of Experiment 2. (C) Predictions of a Bayesian model with Gaussian likelihood 
distributions. The posterior is obtained by combining likelihood and prior while the likelihood of the last 
stimulus is shifted according to the presentation anisochrony. The predictions for a distortion in perceived 
timing of stimuli obtained in Experiment 2 are used to modify the conditions of the interval-based model in 
Experiment 1. It should be noted that there is no BET for isochronous stimuli due to the symmetry of the 
distributions. (D) Prediction of a Bayesian model with asymmetric distributions (Figure 2.6). PSS for 
Experiment 2 are obtained from the posterior of the audio and visual stimuli (see Figure 2.9). The pattern 
indicates that there is no BET for stimuli presented roughly 40 ms earlier than expected. Predictions for 
Experiment 1 are obtained by modifying the timing of stimuli in the interval-based model. 
2.4 Discussion 
Our psychophysical experiments show that temporal regularity can change the perceived 
timing of stimuli – the bias by expected timing effect (BET) – without requiring 
participants to perform speeded responses (that can be affected by motor preparation), nor 
magnitude estimation (that can be subject to behavioural optimization (Petzschner et al., 
2015)). The results of Experiment 2 indicate that the BET leads to an acceleration of 
stimuli presented at the expected time point or later. In addition, the BET for stimuli 
presented earlier than expected induces a perceptual delay. It has been reported that longer 
sequences lead to better discrimination of anisochrony (Drake & Botte, 1993; Miller & 
McAuley, 2005; Schulze, 1989) and current accounts of temporal sensitivity predict 
 36 
symmetric performance for early and late stimuli (Barnes & Jones, 2000; Henry & 
Herrmann, 2014; Large & Palmer, 2002; McAuley & Jones, 2003). However, there have 
been no studies that have tested this prediction, although “slight asymmetries” in the 
profile of data have been previously described (Barnes & Jones, 2000). Our data show that 
this is not the case and it is more in line with the asymmetric distortion in perceived 
duration for early and late stimuli. 
The BET counteracts the improved detectability of stimuli presented later than 
expected, that is, stimuli following a long sequence that are presented later than expected 
are perceptually accelerated (leading to an increase of “regular” responses) against the 
detectability of the asynchrony (which should lead to an increase of “irregular” responses). 
On the other hand, from the results of Experiment 2 we see that perceptual delay is only 
present at large anisochronies for stimuli presented earlier than expected (larger than the 
point where the two curves cross in Experiment 2, around 40ms as in Figure 2.2B, which 
is captured by the model in Figure 2.7D). Thus the BET for early stimuli is insufficient to 
counteract the effect of the improved detectability leading to an asymmetric distribution of 
responses as also shown in Figure 2.7D.  
Figure 2.7 allows us to qualitatively compare the predictions of extant models of 
time perception with the ones of our proposed model. The difference between the 
predictions are striking considering the number of fitted parameters:  
- JND2 obtained for three stimuli sequences used to predict the values with more stimuli, 
and fitted weight l for the multiple look (interval) model;  
- period coupling q, period coupling η, and focusing κ all fitted for the entrainment model;  
- standard deviation of accumulated noise σ calculated with pre-test data, and fitted 
constant ω to the prior for the asymmetric Bayesian model.  
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Interval-based models explain perceptual effects related to the presence of 
rhythmic sequences through a modification of the representation of the interval duration 
(Church et al., 1994; Drake & Botte, 1993). Whilst the model accounts for an increase in 
the sensitivity to temporal deviations (Figure 2.7A), such a predicted increase is 
necessarily symmetrical and thus cannot account for the experimental data. Furthermore, 
the model does not predict changes in the perceived timing of stimuli at different 
anisochronies as it is based on the representation of interval durations. 
To quantify the predictions of entrainment models, we simulated an eminent model 
tailored to the experimental paradigm employed in Experiment 1 (Large & Palmer, 2002). 
We find that the detection of irregularity does not follow the asymmetric pattern of 
Experiment 1 (Figure 2.7B). Entrainment models could be formulated to predict changes 
in perceived timing of stimuli by appealing to the prior-entry effect (Spence & Parise, 
2010) as a function of temporal attention (Barnes & Jones, 2000; Breska & Deouell, 2014; 
Large & Palmer, 2002). The outcome is a symmetric acceleration that decreases with 
deviant stimuli (Figure 2.7B). It should be noted that in the original formulation, the 
detection of irregularity has been thought to be unaffected by this temporal distortion 
(Large & Palmer, 2002). 
The Bayesian model with symmetric distributions predicts that the perceived timing 
of irregular stimuli should be biased so to make any deviant intervals to be more similar to 
previously experienced ones (Shi et al., 2013). The magnitude of the bias decreases with 
large anisochronies and the effect is identical for stimuli presented too early and too late 
leading to a symmetric pattern in Experiment 2 (Figure 2.7C). The distortion in perceived 
timing towards isochrony should make the detection of anisochronies more difficult, 
leading to a wider (and symmetric) distribution of responses in Experiment 1.  
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The Bayesian model with asymmetric distributions is based on the relaxation of the 
normality assumption often employed in BDT accounts (Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010; 
Miyazaki et al., 2005; Sciutti, Burr, Saracco, Sandini, & Gori, 2014; Shi et al., 2013). As 
for the prior entry phenomena (J. J. J. McDonald et al., 2005), perceptual acceleration for 
on-time and late stimuli and perceptual delay for early stimuli are explained through a 
changes in the shape of the posterior – not by a shift of the distribution. In this way, the 
absence of a BET is predicted for stimuli presented approximately 40 ms earlier than 
expected, not for isochronous stimuli. The asymmetry in the BET makes the predicted 
pattern of perceived timing of stimuli shown in Figure 2.7D qualitatively match the pattern 
of results visible in Figure 2.2B. The model predicts a temporal regularization as in 
recently-proposed models of interval estimation and reproduction (Jazayeri & Shadlen, 
2010; Miyazaki et al., 2005; Sciutti et al., 2014), as interval duration estimates are 
computationally successive to the estimate of individual stimulus timings (Schwartze & 
Kotz, 2013). We propose that such regularization could be seen as a modulation of the 
prior-entry effect as a function of the survival probability (Janssen & Shadlen, 2005; 
Nobre et al., 2007). The distortion in perceived timing also generates better discrimination 
of temporal irregularities for early than for late stimuli in long sequences, which resembles 
the pattern found in Experiment 1 (Figure 2.1B). In sum, the asymmetric Bayesian model 
provides predictions that qualitatively resemble the data of the two experiments.   
The model, perhaps counterintuitively, predicts that the BET should not vary 
substantially if the sequence is composed of different stimuli (i.e. sounds vs. lights) as we 
assume common processing mechanisms across modalities (Petzschner et al., 2015). 
Because the prior resembles the likelihood and the BET is due to the ratio between the 
width of the prior and the width of likelihood, the ratio between the two widths remains 
roughly constant. For this reason, BET curves have similar vertical deformations for 
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different stimulus types (Figure 2.8). The difference between stimuli becomes evident as a 
modulation in the tuning of the effect (i.e. the spread of the BET across anisochronies). As 
we find no effect of anisochrony on PSS with 4 stimuli in Experiment 3, but the same 
condition leads to a BET effect in Experiment 2, we hypothesize that the difference can be 
accounted for by the added constant ω, whose value is higher because of the use of only 
audio sequences. Because of the shape of the prior over time, the model also naturally 
accounts for perceptual phenomena related to the scalar property of interval timing (the 
estimation error of an interval increasing as the IOI increases (Gibbon et al., 1984)) as with 
longer intervals the prior becomes flatter leading to a smaller BET (Figure 2.5).  
 
Figure 2.8. Predictions of the Bayesian models for Experiment 2 with different values of the added constant 
ω: higher values lead to flatter curves as the prior has effectively less and less effect and the BET is smaller. 
(A) Bayesian model of perceived timing with symmetrical distributions and (B) with asymmetrical 
distributions. 
In our experimental paradigms we exploit a prior based on the natural tendency of 
intervals to be similar to the ones previously experienced. The effect of such a prior on the 
posterior probability can be quickly modulated without a lifetime experience of the natural 
environmental statistics (Weiss, Simoncelli, & Adelson, 2002) or without the need to 
present the same property throughout the experiment (Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010). Such 
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rapid modulations are in line with the bottom up influence of regular sequences on 
perception (Breska & Deouell, 2014) and have also been found in simultaneity judgments 
after exposure to only one audiovisual stimulus (Van der Burg, Alais, & Cass, 2013). 
Changes in simultaneity perception have also been related to changes in perceived timing 
of individual stimuli (Di Luca, Machulla, & Ernst, 2009) that in some accounts have been 
explained by changes of the likelihood function (Sato & Aihara, 2009), rather than by the 
presence of an asymmetric prior as proposed here. 
The iterative formation of the prior within a trial can be seen as the progressive 
entrainment of cortical activity leading to tuned attentional deployment (Henry & 
Herrmann, 2014; Lakatos et al., 2008; Rohenkohl & Nobre, 2011). The phase of delta-
theta activity could be a plausible neurophysiological mechanism for representing a-priori 
probabilities of encountering a stimulus (Arnal & Giraud, 2012), and recent work supports 
our view that facilitation of sensory processing is shaped by a-priori probability of 
stimulus timing (Carnevale et al., 2015). The results of their simulations (Carnevale et al., 
2015) show a pattern with a very similar shape as the prior shown in Figure 2.6b. 
Temporal expectations have been shown to lead to a desynchronization of alpha-band 
activity (Rohenkohl & Nobre, 2011), where the neural response to stimuli is amplified at 
the expected time point leading to the modulation of perceived timing (J. J. J. McDonald et 
al., 2005). Stimuli presented too early are not amplified, but the slow offset makes stimuli 
that are presented too late to be amplified, leading to the asymmetric effect on perceived 
timing found here. 
2.4.1 Conclusion 
In this paper we have proposed a quantitative model for the bias by expected timing (BET) 
effect, where temporal expectations are modelled as Bayesian priors. Such priors come 
into place after only two identical stimuli and they act as predictors for when a future 
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stimulus should occur. Our results suggests that the brain processes stimuli based on a 
probabilistic assessment of whether they will be presented at every point in time and that 
the resultant temporal expectations can lead to marked distortions in perceived timing.  
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2.5 Methods 
2.5.1 Ethics Statement 
The study and all experimental protocols were approved by the STEM Ethics Committee 
of the University of Birmingham. The methods were carried out in accordance with the 
approved guidelines. 
2.5.2 Participants 
Participants were 90 undergraduate students with an average age of 20.83 (SD: 2.20). In 
total there were 90 undergraduate student participants with an average age of 20.83 (SD: 
2.20). In Experiment 1 there were 15 participants (10 females, Mage = 21.07, SDage = 1.87) 
in the auditory experiment, and 15 in the visual experiment (9 females, Mage = 20.27, SDage 
= 1.83); In Experiment 2 there were 12 participants (10 females, Mage = 20.67, SDage = 
2.50); In Experiment 3, 24 participants (18 females, Mage = 21.17, SDage = 2.53); whilst in 
Experiment 4 there were 24 participants (16 females, Mage = 20.67, SDage = 2.16). 
Informed consent was taken prior to the experiment from all participants, who were either 
compensated £6 per hour or were given course credits. All participants reported normal or 
corrected-to-normal hearing and vision, and they were all naïve to the purpose of the 
experiment. 
2.5.3 Experimental Setup 
Participants sat in a quiet, well-lit room at a distance of approximately 50 cm from the 
light- and sound-producing apparatus. Visual stimuli were flashes produced by a red 5 mm 
LED positioned in front of the participant (20 ms with 5 ms linear ramp, 91 Cd/m2). Audio 
stimuli were beeps produced by a speaker 50 cm to the left of the participant (20 ms with 
5 ms linear ramp, 1 kHz, 75.1 dBA). Signals were generated using a computer audio card 
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connected to two identical audio amplifiers. Signals for the whole trial were loaded on the 
audio card before the trial started to ensure accurate timing. 
2.5.4 Psychophysical Procedures 
Experiment 1 – Isochrony Judgments. The aim of Experiment 1 was to test whether 
there is an increase in sensitivity to temporal deviations as a function of how many stimuli 
there are in a sequence. Fifteen participants took part in the audio experiment and another 
fifteen in the visual experiment. Sequences of 3, 4, 5 or 6, unimodal stimuli (either audio 
or visual) were presented with a regular Inter-onset Interval (IOI) of 700 ms except the last 
stimulus, which had a deviation of 0, ±20, ±40, ±60, ±80, ±100, ±150, or ±200 ms. Each 
trial type was repeated 8 times. The participant’s task was to report whether the last 
stimulus appeared to be regular or not with the rest of the isochronous sequence. 
Participants responded by pressing one of two keys and the next stimulus would appear 1.5 
to 2s after they had been released. For each participant, we computed the proportion of 
responses for each anisochrony and sequence length. Individual trials for different 
conditions were randomly interleaved in all experiments. The data of all participants were 
analysed. 
Experiment 2 – Audiovisual Temporal Order Judgments. The goal of Experiment 2 
was to understand whether the anisochrony at which a stimulus is presented affected the 
perceived timing of a stimulus in a sequence. Twelve participants took part in the 
experiment. Participants completed the experiment in two phases: the practice phase and 
test phase. The goal of the practice phase was to familiarize participants with the 
audiovisual TOJ task, assess performance, and provide baseline data for the creation of the 
Bayesian models. Participants were presented with a single audiovisual stimulus pair 
separated by a stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) of 0, ±20, ±90, ±170, ±250, or ±350 ms. 
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Each SOA was repeated 6 times, totalling 66 trials. The participant’s task was to report 
whether the audio or visual stimulus appeared first in time. Participants responded by 
pressing one of two keys and the next stimulus would appear 1.5 to 2s after they had been 
released. 
During the test phase, participants were presented with a unimodal (either audio or 
visual) sequence of 4 stimuli having an IOI of 700 ms except the last stimulus, which 
deviated by either 0, ±40, ±80 ms. The last stimulus in the sequence was presented 
together with a stimulus in the other modality (e.g., a visual stimulus paired with a 
sequence of sound stimuli) with an SOA of 0, ±40, ±80, ±120, or ±200 ms with respect to 
the anisochrony of the last stimulus presented. Each trial type was repeated 8 times. The 
participant’s task was to report which of the two stimuli presented at the 4th timepoint 
appeared first in time – “audio first” or “visual first”. Participants responded by pressing 
one of two keys and the next stimulus would appear 1.5 to 2s after they had been released.  
For each participant, we computed the proportion of responses for each presented 
SOA. Of particular interest to our hypotheses was the point of subjective simultaneity 
(PSS): the SOA at which an individual participant was equally likely to respond that either 
of the two stimuli was first. Positive PSS values mean that the light had to be presented 
before the sound to be perceived as synchronous and negative values indicate that the 
sound had to be presented before the light for perceived synchrony. Changes in PSS as a 
function of anisochrony indicate a modification of the perceived timing of stimuli due to 
expectation. Also of interest was the just-noticeable difference (JND), the asynchrony 
necessary so that participants report the correct order of the stimuli at a proportion of .84 
(which corresponds to 2σ). The PSS and JND were estimated as the first and second 
moments of the distribution underlying the psychometric function by using the Spearman-
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Kärber method (Miller & Ulrich, 2001). This method provides non-parametric estimates 
that avoid assumptions about the distributions underlying the psychometric functions. A 
mathematical derivation of the method follows. First we define SOAi with i={1, ... 15} as 
the 15 values of audiovisual SOA used in the experiments and pi with i={1, … 15} as the 
associated proportion of “light first” responses. We further set two SOAs outside of the 
range tested, SOA0 =-250 ms, SOA16=+250 ms to be able to compute the intermediate SOA 
between two successive ones 
 𝑠! =    !"#!!!!!"#!! , with i={0, ... 15}  (Eq. 2.1) 
We then define two associated proportions to these extreme SOAs p0=0, and p16=1, and we 
calculated the associated values of the difference in proportion, taken at and above 0 to 
monotonize the proportion of responses  
  𝑑𝑝! = 𝑚𝑎𝑥  (0, 𝑝!!! − 𝑝!)  ,    with  i={0,  ...  15}   (Eq. 2.2) 
With these indexes we can express PSS and JND analytically as such: 
   (Eq. 2.3) 
and 
   (Eq. 2.4) 
Values of PSS and JND in the test phase of the experiment were used to assess participant 
performance. If JND was below 200 ms and if PSS did not exceed ±175 ms, participants 
data was not included in the analyses. The data of 4 participants were not analysed. The 
test phase data was used to determine the likelihood distribution parameters of both the 
symmetric and asymmetric Bayesian models (detailed below) as this simple TOJ task was 
not biased by temporal expectations and thus reflected likelihood probabilities alone.  
PSS =
1P15
i=0 dpi
15X
i=0
sidpi
JND =
vuut 15X
i=0
dpi(si   PSS)2
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Experiment 3 – Number of Stimuli in a Sequence. Experiment 3 was aimed at measuring 
whether the changes in PSS found in Experiment 2 increase as a function of the number of 
stimuli in a sequence. Twenty-four participants took part in the experiment. Only one 
sequence length was presented in each of four blocks (the order was counterbalanced 
across participants). Sequences of 3, 4, or 5 audio stimuli were presented with an IOI of 
700 ms except the last stimulus, which had a deviation of 0ms or ±40 ms. The last stimulus 
was presented together with a visual stimulus with an SOA of 0, ±40, ±80, ±120, or 
±200 ms. Each trial type was presented 12 times. The data of all participants were 
analysed. 
Experiment 4 – Sequences with Different Periods. The goal of Experiment 4 was to check 
whether changes in PSS still occur if sequences don’t have the exact same period. Twenty-
four participants took part in this experiment. Four types of audio sequences were 
presented with an IOI of 400, 700, or 1000 ms, except the last stimulus, which had a 
deviation of ±40 ms. The last stimulus was presented together with a visual stimulus with 
an SOA of 0, ±40, ±80, ±120, or ±200 ms. Each trial type was presented 12 times. The 
data of all participants were analysed. 
2.5.5 Model Predictions 
Interval-Based Model. We adapted the formula of the multiple-look model (Drake & 
Botte, 1993) to the conditions of Experiment 1 by formulating the participant’s task as the 
comparison between a variable number of intervals with one final interval. In this way we 
could estimate the JND obtained with intervals of N={3, 4, 5} (𝐽𝑁𝐷!! ) from the individual 
subjects’ value of JND with the sequence of 2 intervals (𝐽𝑁𝐷!). JND is calculated from 
Equation 2.4 by substituting the proportion of “regular” responses to dp. 
   𝐽𝑁𝐷!! =      𝐽𝑁𝐷!!    !! +    1− 𝑙    , with N = {3,4,5}  (Eq. 2.5) 
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The weight parameter l was tuned by minimizing the sum of the squared differences 
between the observed data and the model for the audio and visual modalities. As such, the 
l parameter was 0.964 for audio and 0.958 vision. Predicted 𝐽𝑁𝐷!!  were used as parameters 
of Gaussian distributions of the responses (the maximum point of the curves was 
normalized to 1 for better comparison across the models). The mean response distributions 
across participants for each sequence length are shown in Figure 2.7A. Interval-based 
models predict no changes in perceived timing of stimuli, leading to constant PSS values 
as a function of anisochrony. 
Entrainment Model. We implemented the entrainment model for perceived temporal 
regularities (Large & Palmer, 2002) and simulated 1000 stimuli for each of the temporal 
deviations and sequence lengths used in Experiment 1. For greater detail please refer to 
Large & Palmer (2002). We tuned individual parameters by minimizing the sum of the 
squared error between the observed data and model output to audio (period coupling q=.2, 
oscillation coupling η=3.5, amplitude of the stimulus X=1, focusing parameter κ=1.9) and 
visual sequences (q=1, η=3, X=1, κ=1.5), both with an oscillator period of p=700 ms. The 
probability distribution of a regular sequence obtained is shown in Figure 2.7B (maximum 
point normalized to 1). Entrainment models do not make an explicit prediction about a 
change in the perceived timing of stimuli, however to show how entrainment models could 
be modified by temporal attention, we included a 15 ms prior entry effect (Spence & 
Parise, 2010) that is proportional to an attentional pulse (Barnes & Jones, 2000; Jones & 
Boltz, 1989; Large & Palmer, 2002). 
Bayesian Symmetric Model. Perception is obtained from the posterior distribution, the 
combination of the on-line sensory evidence (likelihood) with the a-priori knowledge of 
when a stimulus is expected to be sensed (prior). We propose that expectations are not 
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static, but they are obtained by iteratively updating the probability of encountering a 
stimulus at each point in the future.  
The likelihood probability distribution 𝑝! 𝑡   is the probability of sensing a stimulus 
at time t given that the stimulus is produced in the environment. A Gaussian distribution 
with mean 𝜇  and variance σ! is used to describe the noise in sensory latency. We constrain 𝜇 = k 𝜎 and determine the value of the parameters kA, σA, kV and σV (subscripts A and V 
denote audio and vision respectively) that give most similar values of PSS and JND (via  
grid search of the minimum sum of squared differences) obtained as described in Figure 
2.9 to test phase data of Experiment 2 (PSS=25 ms visual first and JND=130 ms). This 
leads to values of kA=50, σA=.038, kV=30 and σV=.071. The posterior probability 
distribution 𝑝! 𝑡  is obtained by multiplying the probabilities of the likelihood 𝑝! 𝑡   and 
the prior 𝑝! 𝑡  
  𝑝! 𝑡 ∝ 𝑝! 𝑡 ∙   𝑝! 𝑡    (Eq. 2.6) 
The prior probability distribution 𝑝! 𝑡   is obtained by using the posterior probability 𝑝! 𝑡   for the previous stimulus (i.e., 𝑝! 𝑡   for the time t-IOI). The added constant ω leads 
to a prior with heavy tails (Roach, Heron, & McGraw, 2006) that allows sudden changes in 
IOI and thus decreases the tendency of fully incorporating the posterior into a new prior 
(thus mitigating the increase in False Alarms, Carnevale et al., 2015). This is expressed by:  
  𝑝! 𝑡 + 𝐼𝑂𝐼 ∝ 𝑝! 𝑡 + 𝜔  (Eq. 2.7) 
The parameter ω changes the predictions of the model as shown in Figure 2.8A. 
To obtain the predictions for Experiment 2 we calculated the values of the posterior 
probability distributions for the last stimulus in the sequence applying Equations 2.6 and 
2.7 iteratively. Following previous empirical work (Boenke, Deliano, & Ohl, 2009), we 
assume that the brain does not only consider the onset of the stimulus to perform a TOJ. 
Although it is unclear what feature is considered for temporal order judgments (Miller & 
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Schwarz, 2006; Sternberg & Knoll, 1973), for computational simplicity, we adopt the 
mean of the distribution. At each trial, the response is determined by the sign of the 
difference in timing between the means of the distributions to be compared (Sternberg & 
Knoll, 1973). A similar, but computationally more tractable rule, would be to calculate the 
difference in timing between which the accumulation of the two distributions reaches 0.5 
(i.e. the time of the median probability). To calculate the proportion of responses across 
trials, we then applied signal detection theory (Figure 2.9) to the audio and visual posterior 
distributions over time (Green & Swets, 1973) to obtain the predicted probability of 
response for each asynchrony tested. We then obtained a PSS using Equation 2.3. The 
value of the parameter ω modulates the amount of regularization as shown in Figure 2.8A. 
Figure 2.7C is obtained with the same ω as the asymmetric model. 
To derive the predictions for Experiment 1, we used the JNDs calculated in the 
interval-based model (Eq. 2.5) to determine the Gaussian curves for each sequence length. 
Before calculating the response probability using said Gaussians, we applied a temporal 
distortion to the sensed stimulus timing equal to the PSS obtained in Experiment 2. 
 
Figure 2.9. Example of how Signal Detection Theory is used to compute model responses. (A) This example 
represents what happens in TOJ tasks with an audio stimulus presented 90 ms before a visual stimulus. The 
posterior distributions of the audio and visual stimuli are considered to compute the proportion of sound first 
responses. The unbiased criterion is established by finding the point that gives the highest d’ between the two 
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curves. The probability of “sound first” responses is calculated as the sum of the two areas below the visual 
posterior and on the left of the criterion (Hits) and below the audio posterior on the right of the criterion (CR). 
(B) The values of probability of “sound first” responses obtained from the model for different SOAs are 
analyzed using the Spearman-Kärber method as for participants’ responses (see Methods). 
Bayesian Asymmetric Model. The likelihood probability distribution 𝑝! 𝑡   is 
modeled as the bounded accumulation of sensory information with rate 𝜇  and neural noise 
that is Gaussian with variance 𝜎! at each time point (Ratcliff, 1978). We fixed the starting 
point of the accumulation (value 0) and the threshold level (value 1). As such, the 
expression of the likelihood can be rendered analytically as a bounded Wiener process, i.e. 
the accumulation of sensory evidence until a threshold is reached with additive Gaussian 
noise. The probability of reaching the threshold over time is expressed by:   
  𝑝! 𝑡 ∝ 𝑒! !"!!!!(!!!")!   (Eq. 2.8) 
The proportional sign is due to the normalization across the whole distribution, that makes 
the area under the curve equal to 1. We set the accumulation rate to 𝜇=10 and, as for the 
symmetric model, we determined the value of the parameter σA and σV that give most 
similar values (through a grid search of the minimum sum of squared differences) of PSS 
and JND to audiovisual data obtained in the test phase, obtaining σA=30 ms and σV=85 ms 
(see Figure 2.6A). The prior probability distribution and posterior probability distribution 
are obtained as described for the symmetric model (Eq. 2.6 and 2.7). The predictions for 
the asymmetric Bayesian model are presented in Figure 2.7D where the parameter ω 
modulates the BET as shown in Figure 2.8B. Parameters were fit for each subject in all 
models.  
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2.6 Supplementary Information 
 
 
Supplementary Figure 2.1. Proportion of “regular” responses in Experiment 1S plotted as a function of the 
anisochrony of the last audio stimulus. Sequence lengths were presented in different blocks of trials (rather 
than interleaved as in Experiment 1). Fifteen new participants took part in this experiment. Asterisks denote 
asynchronies at which the proportion of responses differs across sequence lengths showing a change in 
responses for stimuli presented earlier than expected. 
 
Supplementary Figure 2.2. PSS values obtained in Experiment 2S with simultaneity judgments performed 
by 12 new participants. PSS was obtained by substituting dp with p in SI Equations 3 and 4 in SI Materials 
and Methods. All other experimental conditions are identical to Experiment 2 whose data is shown in Figure 
2.2 and 2.3. PSS values qualitatively replicate the change in BET as a function of anisochrony of the last 
stimulus (interaction term of a two-way r.m. ANOVA, F(4,44)=5.2, p=.0016, ηp²=.32). The prominence of a 
delay in the BET could be due to a different response criterion with the two sequence types or to a decrease 
in perceptual acceleration. I.e., it has been previously established that prior-entry biases leading to perceptual 
acceleration have larger magnitude in TOJ than SJ data (Spence & Parise, 2010). It should be noted that this 
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pattern is inconsistent with the predictions of interval-based models (there should be no change) and of 
entrainment models (they cannot account for delay). 
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Chapter 3 Temporal Regularity of the 
Environment Drives Time Perception 
In this paper, we tested if the temporal context biases the perception of regularity – as well as the perceived 
timing of stimuli. We present a parsimonious account of the phenomena we observed based on the Bayesian 
framework. 
 
3.1 Abstract 
What causes a sequence of isochronous stimuli be perceived as temporally regular? It’s 
instinctive to assume that a regularly timed sequence should always be perceived as 
regular, but here we show that such a judgment depends on what environment the 
sequence is presented in. A regularly timed environment promotes perceptual 
regularisation of small irregularities by changing the perceived timing of stimuli. In 
contrast, an environment composed of irregularly timed sequences can make even 
perfectly regular sequences be perceived as irregular due to the untamed variability in 
neural processing. These results suggest that the brain learns the temporal statistics of the 
environment and uses them to generate expectations about future stimuli. The combination 
of temporal expectations with sensory information has the effect of modulating the time at 
which stimuli are perceived and of improving the reliability of temporal estimates. 
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3.2 Introduction 
Time is a physical dimension that pervades numerous aspects of human perception, yet 
humans do not perceive time veridically. For example, the subjective experience of 
duration can be modulated by non-temporal characteristics such as stimulus properties 
(Horr & Di Luca, 2015a; Thomas & Brown, 1974; Wearden et al., 2007), complexity 
(Schiffman & Bobko, 1977), stimulus regularity [3], sensory modality (Goldstone & 
Lhamon, 1974; Wearden et al., 1998; 2006), and context (Dyjas & Ulrich, 2013). As 
subjective duration can be biased by the characteristics of the immediate environment, 
here we ask whether the perception of temporal regularity is subject to similar influences. 
In fact, we observe that context plays a role in the perception of rhythmic stimuli, as 
humans effortlessly learn the temporal structure of events (Grahn & Rowe, 2013; Kösem 
& van Wassenhove, 2012; Large & Palmer, 2002; Povel, 1981; 1984; Su & Pöppel, 2012), 
an ability that is present even in new-borns and infants (Hannon & Trehub, 2005; Winkler, 
Haden, Ladinig, Sziller, & Honing, 2009). It has been shown that humans, among other 
animals (Bateson & Kacelnik, 1997; Buhusi et al., 2002; Gallistel et al., 2004; Gribova et 
al., 2002; Henderson et al., 2006; Janssen & Shadlen, 2005), can improve perceptual 
judgments (Brochard et al., 2013; Correa et al., 2005; Cravo et al., 2013; Doherty, Rao, 
Mesulam, & Nobre, 2005; Escoffier et al., 2010; Grill-Spector, Henson, & Martin, 2006; 
Rohenkohl & Nobre, 2011), reduce neural metabolic consumption (VanRullen & Dubois, 
2011) and automatize behaviour (McNeill, 1995; Repp, 2005) by entraining to regular 
rhythms. Whilst there are several accounts of how the brain deals with rhythmic stimuli 
(Buhusi & Meck, 2005; Buonomano & Merzenich, 1995; Creelman, 1962; Gibbon, 1977; 
Gibbon et al., 1984; Karmarkar & Buonomano, 2007; Meck, 2005; Shi et al., 2013; Teki, 
Grube, & Griffiths, 2011; Treisman, 1963; van Rijn, Gu, & Meck, 2014; Wackermann & 
Ehm, 2006), all of them assume that a stimulus repeated after the same interval is actually 
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perceived to be a regular sequence. But as noted previously, time is subject to perceptual 
distortions so why should a temporal property like regularity be immune to these too? 
In order to test whether perceived regularity of a sequence can change due to the 
influence of the environment, we present sequences of stimuli that are mostly regularly 
timed to one group of participants, whereas to a second group we present mostly 
irregularly timed sequences. For both groups, 25% of trials contained a perfectly regular 
sequence i.e. with the same inter-onset interval (isochrony). We find that an environment 
of mostly irregularly-timed stimuli makes regular sequences appear irregular. We rule out 
explanations based on response biases or changes in the criterion for judging regularity 
and we propose an explanation of these effects that is based on the influence of 
expectations on the perceived timing of individual stimuli, i.e. the brain makes predictions 
about the timing of future events that modify perception. An ideal candidate to 
conceptualise this phenomenon is Bayesian Decision Theory (BDT), which has been 
successfully applied to various perceptual domains (Kersten & Yuille, 2003; Knill & 
Richards, 1996; Mamassian et al., 2002; Petzschner & Glasauer, 2011; Wolpert & 
Ghahramani, 2000). Bayesian accounts of time perception have been also formulated 
(Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010; Petzschner et al., 2015; Shi et al., 2013), but they do not 
account for changes in the perceived timing of individual stimuli as they are contingent on 
the representation of the interval durations that stimuli delimit. In contrast, we suggest that 
the brain represents the timing of events separately from duration for the purpose of 
estimating temporal properties of the stimulus sequence, i.e. regularity. Such a scheme 
relies on previous knowledge about the timing of stimuli. In a regular environment, 
perceived timing of stimuli is obtained by the combination of incoming sensory 
information with expectations of when such stimuli should appear. Expected timing should 
thus bias perception in a way that regularises slightly anisochronous stimuli. To test this, 
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we measured when stimuli at the end of a sequence are perceived and we find a temporal 
regularisation effect – stimuli are delayed or accelerated shifting them closer to isochrony 
points. Our results give more credence to the contemporary idea (Acerbi et al., 2012; 
Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010) that the brain keeps track of the temporal statistics of the 
environment and uses them for perception in a way consistent with Bayesian inference. 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 The Temporal Environment Modifies Perceived Regularity  
To test whether the regularity of the environment changes how temporal regularity of 
stimulus sequences is actually perceived, we exposed participants either to an environment 
where the majority of sequences were perceived to be temporally regular (regular 
environment, Figure 3.1a upper panel) or in an environment where most of the sequences 
were perceived to be irregular (irregular environment, Figure 3.1a lower panel). To assess 
the sensitivity of participants to discriminate whether a sequence is regular (ten Hoopen et 
al., 2011; 1995; Schulze, 1989), for both groups we presented 25% of sequences composed 
of 5 beeps where only the timing of the last stimulus deviated from isochrony. The 
participants’ task was to report whether the sequence as a whole was regular – or not. By 
parametrically varying the timing of the last stimulus we could determine the deviations at 
which sequences started to appear irregular. 
Participants did not change their responses in the two contexts, as the overall 
proportion of ‘regular’ responses did not differ between groups (t18=1.3, p=0.22). On the 
other hand, the distribution of responses for sequences composed of 4 initial regularly-
timed stimuli as a function of the deviation of the last stimulus follows a different pattern 
in the two groups (Figure 3.1b, see Supplementary Figure 3.1 and Supplementary Table 
3.1 for responses with jittered sequences). For participants exposed to an irregular 
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environment, the number of ‘regular’ responses for slight deviations in the timing of the 
last stimulus appears to be much lower than the same sequence embedded in the regular 
environment (significant between -40 and 20ms, see Supplementary Table 3.2 for t-tests). 
Crucially, participants are also more likely to report perfectly regular sequences (0ms 
anisochrony) as being irregular when embedded in an irregular environment. The 
difference between the two groups disappears for larger deviations of the last stimulus in 
the sequence. Further, when the last stimulus had 0ms anisochrony, participants’ perceive 
regularity the most when the previous stimuli were isochronous – but perceived regularity 
declines almost linearly as a function of the temporal jitter (Supplementary Figure 3.2). To 
rule out a change in the criterion used to determine regularity, we applied the two-noisy 
criteria simultaneity judgment model (Yarrow, Jahn, Durant, & Arnold, 2011) to the data 
shown in Figure 3.1. The estimates of the early (negative anisochronies) and late (positive 
anisochronies) criteria for judging regularity and the slopes at the threshold point do not 
differ between regular and irregular environments (paired sample t-test on threshold for 
early t18=0.2, p=0.82; late t18=-0.7, p=0.51; on slope for early t18=-1.7, p=0.20; late t18=-
2.3, p=0.060). By ruling out the presence of response biases we can increase our 
confidence in concluding that the environment had a genuine influence on the perception 
of sequence regularity. 
 58 
 
Figure 3.1. Experimental stimuli, design and results for Experiment 1. (a) Top: Example of a sequence with 
small jitter with the final stimulus earlier than expected. Bottom: Example of a sequence with large jitter 
with the final stimulus later than expected. (b) Proportion of ‘regular’ responses as a function of the timing 
of the final auditory stimulus in the sequence. Each line represents data obtained with 0 ms temporal jitter for 
the small and large jitter groups. The distribution of responses becomes steeper with sequences with small 
jitter compared to large jitter (interaction term of two-way r.m. ANOVA on the inverse-normal proportion of 
‘regular’ responses bounded between .01-.99; for the regular context group: F42,378=3.6, p<.0001, ηp²=.28; 
and irregular context group F42,378=5.0, p<.0001, ηp²=.36) . When comparing 0ms jitter from the group 
exposed to small and large amounts of jitter, the distribution of responses is significantly lower for the large 
jitter group at the points denoted by an asterisk (Supplementary Table 3.2). In all graphs, the error bars 
represent the standard error of the mean. 
3.3.2 The Temporal Environment Changes Perceived Timing 
Here we posit that since perceived regularity of isochronous sequences could be decreased 
if sequences are embedded in a temporally irregular environment, the opposite could be 
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also true – the brain could have a mechanism that makes slightly anisochronous sequences 
appear more regular if embedded in a temporally-regular environment. This could be 
achieved if the perceived timing of individual stimuli is modified so that they appear closer 
in time to the regular time point. To test whether the perceived timing of a temporally 
deviant stimulus is modified, we asked participants to report whether the final stimulus in 
an auditory sequence was presented before or after a temporal probe in the visual modality 
(Figure 3.2a). To measure the perceived timing of the last stimulus, we compared the 
physical asynchrony at which audio and visual stimuli are perceived to be simultaneous 
(PSS, Point of Subjective Simultaneity) for stimuli presented slightly earlier and later than 
isochrony. If the brain regularises these stimuli, we should find that the perceived timing is 
delayed if the stimulus is presented too early and accelerated if the stimulus is presented 
too late. For sequences with no temporal jitter (the 4 initial stimuli were isochronous) we 
find a change in PSS between early and late stimuli only for the group exposed to a regular 
environment (t11=2.5, p=.030; all others p >.14; see Supplementary Figure 3.3 for a 
representation of this effect on PSS decomposed into early and late presentation). Stimuli 
presented early appear perceptually delayed, whereas stimuli presented late are 
perceptually accelerated. The magnitude of such an effect is highest for stimuli at the end 
of an isochronous sequence of four stimuli (40% of the anisochrony +/-15.3% SEM), but 
the effect is in the same direction for irregular sequences (10, 20 and 30ms temporal jitter 
of the first four stimuli) in the regular environment. No difference in PSS is registered for 
the group exposed to an irregular environment (Figure 3.2c). In other words, participants 
exposed to a regular environment change the perceived timing of slightly deviant stimuli at 
the end of the sequence so that the sequence appears more regular than it actually is – a 
temporal regularisation. Notably, sensitivity in judging the timing of the audio and visual 
stimuli does not differ in the two temporal environments (Supplementary Figure 3.4). 
 60 
 
Figure 3.2. Experimental stimuli, design and results for Experiment 2. (a) Examples of a trial sequences in 
regular environments when the final stimulus was earlier (top panel) or later (bottom panel) than expected. 
(b) Participants judged the temporal order of the final auditory stimulus and a visual probe. (c) Difference in 
perceived timing (as a percentage) between stimuli presented -40 ms earlier than expected and +40 ms later 
than expected as a function of the temporal jitter. Each line represents the group with small jitter, and the 
group with large jitter. Only in the instance where the temporal jitter is 0ms in the small jitter group is the 
difference in perceived timing effect significantly different from 0, t11=2.6, p=.02. Error bars represent the 
standard error of the mean. 
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3.4 Discussion 
This study demonstrates that the degree of temporal regularity experienced in the 
environment underpins our perception of the timing of stimuli. A temporally regular 
environment causes sequences to be reported as being regular more often than when the 
same sequences are presented in an irregular environment. Such a difference is present 
also for perfectly regular sequences. In principle, this result could be explained in three 
different ways: (a) A response bias that leads participants to respond ‘irregular’ more often 
in the irregular environment; (b) A more lenient perceptual criterion for perceiving 
sequences to be regular in the irregular environment which tolerates perceptual 
anisochronies caused by neural noise, or (c) There could be an influence of the regular 
environment on the perception of the timing of individual stimuli, so that they are 
perceptually moved towards the expected time points: earlier than regular stimuli are 
perceptually delayed whilst later than regular stimuli are perceptually accelerated. 
Our data are not consistent with a response bias effect (a) as here one would expect 
to see a general increase in ‘irregular’ responses over all levels of anisochrony. However, 
as Figure 3.1b illustrates, there is only an increase in ‘irregular’ responses for slightly 
irregular sequences suggesting that participants did not change their responses to suit the 
environment they were exposed to. Secondly, we can dismiss explanations pertaining to 
changes in the criterion at which regularity is judged (b), as we found no difference in 
sensitivity to discriminate regularity between groups after implementing the two-noisy 
criteria simultaneity judgment model (Yarrow et al., 2011). This model, which was 
developed in the context of temporal order judgments (Ulrich, 1987), captures the 
probabilistic placement of low and high criteria for perceptual judgments. Values that fall 
within the two criteria are judged differently than either side. In Experiment 1, we apply 
this model to regularity judgments as a function of anisochrony. We find no difference 
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between the high (positive anisochronies) and low (negative anisochronies) criteria for 
judging regularity between regularly- and irregularly-timed environments. The lack of a 
difference between groups suggests no differential sensory noise between regular and 
irregular environments nor differences in the decision uncertainty for judging regularity. 
Our results point to the third explanation (c): the perceived timing of stimuli in a sequence 
is affected by the presence of a regular environment – irregular stimuli in a regular 
environment are perceived closer in time to the expected time point (Figure 3.1, 3.2). This 
effect can be understood as the brain attempting to estimate time from imprecise sensory 
information as detailed below. 
3.4.1 Bayesian Time Perception 
We interpret our results using a Bayesian framework, considering that the brain is trying to 
obtain an estimate of the timing for each stimulus from noisy sensory information. To 
improve the reliability of the estimates, the brain incorporates a-priori knowledge (prior 
probability) of when a future stimulus may occur with incoming sensory evidence 
(likelihood function) of when a stimulus actually occurred in the world (Figure 3.3). We 
consider that the brain dynamically updates the prior probability of experiencing a 
stimulus after each presentation. Temporal expectations rapidly increase and bias the 
timing of stimuli in a regular environment so to make them appear more regular (Figure 
3.3a). In a temporally irregular environment, however, temporal statistics are less precise 
and thus expected timing is more uncertain (Figure 3.3b). An estimate of perceived timing 
is based on the posterior distribution, which is the combination of the prior and likelihood. 
In an irregular environment, the posterior distribution coincides with the likelihood 
distribution (as the there is no regularity in the sequences, the prior does not contribute to 
improve precision). Lower precision means a wider distribution, and thus at each 
encounter of a stimulus, even if physically regular, there is a possibility that the stimulus is 
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actually anisochronous. For stimuli embedded in a regular environment, instead, 
expectations improve the precision of timing estimates making stimuli appear closer to the 
presented time point but they also influence the timing of slightly deviant stimuli. Such an 
effect is evidenced by the results of Experiment 2 – where participants were asked to judge 
whether the final stimulus in a sequence was before or after the visual probe. In a 
regularly-timed environment, slightly anisochronous stimuli are biased to appear closer in 
time to the expected time point (Figure 3.2c) due to the effect of the prior. 
 
Figure 3.3. A Bayesian Model of Perceived Timing. (a) A regular sequence in a regular environment builds 
up temporal expectations (prior predicted timing; black line) after each presentation of a stimulus 
(likelihood; blue line); in order to form an estimate of perceived timing from the posterior (perception; grey 
dotted line). In this way, the posterior becomes the predicted timing for the next stimulus in the sequence. If 
a final stimulus is presented slightly earlier than expected – then it is perceptually delayed towards the 
predicted timing – as well as having greater temporal precision. (b) A regular sequence in an irregular 
environment on the other hand, the posterior distribution coincides with the likelihood, as a flat prior does 
not contribute to improve precision or generate greater temporal expectations. Lower precision results in a 
 64 
wider posterior distribution and as such, after each stimulus presentation, a physically regular stimulus could 
on chance be reported as being irregular. 
 
We reason that temporal regularisation reflects the tendency of the brain to obtain a 
compact representation of the environment that can be generally applied for perception 
(Baddeley, 1992). In a regular environment, small temporal irregularities are likely to be 
due to sensory noise, and thus representing each individual irregularity would constitute a 
disadvantageous memory burden. Modifying the perceived timing of stimuli, so to appear 
more regular, reduces neural metabolic consumption (VanRullen & Dubois, 2011) and 
improves the perceptual processing of regularly timed stimuli (Brochard et al., 2013; 
Correa et al., 2005; Cravo et al., 2013; Doherty et al., 2005; Escoffier et al., 2010; Grill-
Spector et al., 2006; Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010; Rohenkohl & Nobre, 2011). 
Current models of temporal perception (Gibbon et al., 1984; Karmarkar & 
Buonomano, 2007; Large & Palmer, 2002; C. Miall, 1989; Schulze, 1989; Treisman, 
1963) are mainly concerned with a representation of interval duration and do not make 
explicit predictions about whether the temporal environment should influence the 
perceived timing of temporally deviant stimuli. In fact, in these models, the perceived 
timing of a stimulus is mostly ignored, because they assume that stimuli are simply 
perceived after a constant perceptual delay. More importantly, no model relates the change 
in the detection of temporal deviations to changes in the perceived timing of stimuli. 
Conversely, we find that in a regularly-timed environment stimuli presented earlier than 
expected are perceptually accelerated whilst late stimuli are perceptually delayed. 
3.4.2 Monitoring Temporal Statistics 
Temporal regularity has important ecological functions, i.e. in sensorimotor 
synchronization (Elliott, Wing, & Welchman, 2014; Manning & Schutz, 2013; Merker, 
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Madison, & Eckerdal, 2009; Repp, 2005; Su & Pöppel, 2012), musical performance 
(Honing, 2013; Large & Palmer, 2002; Merchant, Grahn, Trainor, Rohrmeier, & Fitch, 
2015), discrimination (Kusnir, Chica, Mitsumasu, & Bartolomeo, 2011; Rohenkohl, 
Gould, Pessoa, & Nobre, 2014) and causal learning (Greville & Buehner, 2010). Thus it is 
not surprising that the brain monitors regularity across stimuli and uses the regularity of 
the context to modify perception as we present in this study. Exposure to regularities 
results in the expansion of visual working memory (Brady, Konkle, & Alvarez, 2009; 
Umemoto, Scolari, Vogel, & Awh, 2010), improved object labelling (Estes, Evans, 
Alibali, & Saffran, 2007) and object classification (Turk-Browne, Scholl, Johnson, & 
Chun, 2010). The phenomenon we report in this paper is similar to long-term adaption 
effects where the context of the experiment influences our perception – and as such, 
perception is not absolute but relative to some internal reference (Dyjas & Ulrich, 2014). 
Such an effect has been shown in other temporal contexts, i.e. perceived duration (Jazayeri 
& Shadlen, 2010) and simultaneity (Miyazaki, Yamamoto, Uchida, & Kitazawa, 2006). 
Human observers have been shown to use the statistics of the environment to adjust their 
perception – similar to the phenomena we describe in this paper. Adaptation level theory 
(Helson, 1947; 1964) has been proposed to account for such instances as the computational 
problem can be phrased in terms of a null point of a phenomenological dimension. When a 
physical stimulus corresponds to the null point, a ‘neutral’ perception is evoked. The null 
point, however, is subject to adaptation. Applied to our experiments, the null point should 
move toward being more irregular when in an irregular environment, which should have 
resulted in a bias to report more regular responses. This is in contradiction to the results of 
Experiment 1, as we find the reverse – participants reported more irregular responses in an 
irregular environment. 
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The temporal regularisation effect that we report here is consistent with a similar 
tendency found in the literature about perceived duration (Hartcher-O'Brien et al., 2014; 
Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010; Miyazaki et al., 2005; Shi et al., 2013). When asked to 
reproduce intervals, participants do not only employ the information provided by the 
current interval, but they consider the distribution of intervals they have previously been 
exposed to making their response similar to the mean duration (Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010). 
A similar phenomenon is also found in perceived simultaneity, where participants exposed 
to an environment comprising a biased distribution of tactile asynchronies, respond about 
temporal order in the direction of the most frequently presented asynchrony (Miyazaki et 
al., 2006). Such tendencies to assimilate the context in the judgments is in competition 
with contrast effects occurring at a ‘local’ level, where just the previous trial can influence 
the temporal perception of the next (Van der Burg et al., 2013). It has been argued that the 
long-term assimilation and short term contrast effects interact with or precede one another 
(Chopin & Mamassian, 2012; Yamamoto, Miyazaki, Iwano, & Kitazawa, 2012). 
According to such accounts (Chopin & Mamassian, 2012), the perceptual system encodes 
both the prior probabilities of the stimulus distribution over time whilst also representing 
the recent history and redistributing resources in order to efficiently code incoming 
sensory signals (Barlow, 1961; Wainwright, 1999). Such expectation biases perception in a 
way that resolves any perceptual conflict with current sensory information. 
3.4.3 Re-focusing Time Perception 
The Bayesian model of perceived timing we present in this paper advances a re-focusing 
of investigation towards event-based perception in the temporal domain. Historical and 
seminal accounts of time perception are focused on modelling time from the perspective of 
duration (Creelman, 1962; Gibbon et al., 1984; Shi et al., 2013; Treisman, 1963). The 
model we present here is not in competition with such accounts of duration perception 
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(Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010; Petzschner et al., 2015), but it considers a dimension that has 
been overlooked: the perceived timing of stimuli. We reason that expectations about the 
absolute timing of stimuli need to be continuously updated during a sequence and thus 
they must have a fast time-course. On the other hand, long-term priors that enable 
expectations are interval-based and are updated after each stimulus presentation. For this 
reason they have a slow time-course that can represent the statistics of the environment. 
The combination of the two types of information (fast and slow time course) with sensory 
information improves the brain’s efficiency in producing sensory estimates about temporal 
properties of the environment (Friston, 2005; VanRullen & Dubois, 2011; Wei & Stocker, 
2012; 2015). 
3.4.4 Conclusion 
In this study, we have established that the temporal regularity of the environment drives 
time perception. Sequences embedded in regular and irregular environments perceptually 
change, that is:  (1) perceived regularity decreases in an irregular environment and, (2) the 
perceived timing of slightly irregular stimuli is modified to appear more regular if 
embedded in a regular environment.  Using a Bayesian framework, we propose that 
temporal expectations about timing of stimuli are generated based on the statistics of the 
environment. Such expectations bias the perceived timing of stimuli in such a way that 
results in temporal regularisation and thus a more convincing percept of having 
experienced a regular sequence.  
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3.5 Methods 
3.5.1 Experiment 1 
Twenty Undergraduate students from the University of Birmingham took part in this 
experiment. Participants were recruited via the online participant recruitment system and 
received course credits as reimbursement. Participants were naïve to the purpose of the 
study and all had normal or corrected-to-normal hearing or vision.  
The auditory stimuli were identical tones produced by a speaker positioned 50 cm 
to the left of the participant (20 ms with 5 ms linear ramp, 1 kHz, 75.1 dBA). To ensure 
reliable timing, the signals of the whole trial were sent to the audio card before 
presentation. 
Participants sat in a quiet, well-lit room.. After being given instructions and 
informed consent, participants were presented with sequences of five auditory beeps with 
an inter-onset interval (IOI) of 700 ms that could be highly irregular (high jitter group: 0, 
50, 100 or 150 ms jitter) or perceptually regular (small jitter group: 0, 10, 20, 30 ms jitter). 
Sequences were not blocked but were randomly interleaved such that the participant could 
not know the jitter of the next stimulus sequence. The participants’ two-alternative forced 
choice (2AFC) task was to simply report whether the stimulus sequence was regular or not 
by pressing one of two keys. The final stimulus was randomly temporally deviant by 0 ±20 
±40 ±60 ±80 ±100 ±150 or ±200 ms. Participants were asked to respond as accurately as 
possible with no time limit on the response window. After pressing the regular or irregular 
key, the next trial would start after 1.5 - 2 seconds. Each condition was presented 8 times. 
The experiment lasted approximately 30 minutes and participants were debriefed upon 
completion of the task. The data of all participants were analysed. 
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3.5.2 Experiment 2 
Twenty-four undergraduate students were recruited via the University of Birmingham 
research participation system and received course credits for their participation. All 
participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal hearing and vision and were all naïve 
to the purpose of the study. 
The auditory stimuli were five identical tones produced by a speaker approximately 
50 cm to the left of the participant (20 ms with 5 ms linear ramp, 1 kHz, 75.1 dBA). Visual 
stimuli were red flashes of light produced by a 5 mm LED (20 ms with 5 ms linear ramp, 
91 Cd/m2) positioned directly in front of the participant and 20 cm to the right of the 
auditory stimuli. The signals were generated on MATLAB using the psychophysics 
toolbox extension (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997) and sent to the audio card before 
presentation to ensure reliable timing. 
Participants sat in a well-lit and quiet room. Participants performed the experiment 
in 2 phases. In the practice phase participant completed a 2AFC temporal-order (did the 
light or sound come first?) judgment on an auditory and visual stimulus with SOAs of 0, ± 
20, ± 90, ± 170, ± 250, or ± 350 ms, that were repeated 6 times in order to extract a 
psychometric function. Participants responded by pressing one of two keys in order to 
indicate whether the light or sound was perceived first. The next trial would begin 1.5 or 2 
s after the response key had been pressed. The purpose of the practice phase was to 
identify whether the participant could successfully discriminate temporal order. Data was 
not analysed if the ability to discriminate the temporal order (JND) was above 250 ms in 
the practice phase or 200 ms in the test phase. In the test phase, one group of participants 
was exposed to sequences of stimuli that were perceptually isochronous (jitter = 0, 10, 20 
or 30 ms) whilst a second group was exposed to perceptually anisochronous sequences 
(jitter = 0, 50, 100 or 150 ms). In each trial, four auditory stimuli were presented with an 
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IOI of 700 ms. For both groups, 25% of the trials comprised perfectly isochronous 
sequences (no temporal jitter). The participant’s task was to decide whether the last 
auditory stimulus in the sequence was before or after a visual probe stimulus (2AFC: did 
the sound or light come first?). The audio and visual stimuli were presented with one of 9 
SOAs (0, ±40, ±80, ±120, or ±200 ms). Critically, the last auditory stimulus in the 
sequence was presented ± 40 ms earlier or later than expected (negative values mean the 
stimulus was presented earlier than expected). Each condition was repeated 10 times in 
order to construct a psychometric function. 
3.5.3 Psychophysical Analysis 
In order to see a change in the perceived timing of stimuli, the point of subjective 
simultaneity (PSS) from a psychometric function was obtained. Each psychometric 
function was established for each participant by calculating the cumulative proportion of 
responses for each SOA. The proportions of responses in each psychometric function were 
monotonized prior to analysis. We define the PSS as the SOA at which each subject was 
equally likely to report that the visual probe or last repeated stimulus was first. Negative 
PSS values mean that sound had to be presented before the light in order to be perceived as 
synchronous whilst positive values mean that light had to be presented before sound to be 
perceived as synchronous. We use the Spearman-Kärber method to obtain the PSS and 
JND: estimated as the first and second moments of the psychometric function differential 
across SOAs (see Miller & Ulrich, 2001) for further description of method). This PSS 
estimation is a non-parametric method that does not make assumptions about the 
distributions that underlie the obtained psychometric functions. A mathematical derivation 
of the method can be expressed as such: First, we define SOAi with i={1, ... 15} as the 15 
values of SOA used in the experiments and pi with {i=1, … 15} as the associated 
proportion of ‘light first’ responses. We further define SOA0 =-250 ms, SOA16 =+250 ms, 
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p0=0, and p16=1, so that we can compute the intermediate SOA between two successive 
ones 
 𝑠! =    !"#!!!!!"#!! , with i={0, ... 15}  (Eq. 3.1) 
and the associated values of the difference in proportion, taken at and above 0 to 
monotonize the proportion of responses  
  𝑑𝑝! = 𝑚𝑎𝑥  (0, 𝑝!!! − 𝑝!)  ,    with  i={0,  ...  15}   (Eq. 3.2) 
With these indexes we can express PSS analytically as:  
   𝑃𝑆𝑆 =    !!"!!"!!!    𝑠!𝑑𝑝!!"!!!   (Eq. 3.3) 
And the JND as: 
 𝐽𝑁𝐷 =    𝑑𝑝!(𝑠! − 𝑃𝑆𝑆)!!"!!!   (Eq. 3.4) 
Data were not analyzed if participants had a JND above 250 ms or if PSS exceeded ± 175 
ms when data were collapsed across conditions. The data of all participants were analysed. 
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3.6 Supplementary Information 
 
Supplementary Figure 3.1. Additional analysis of Experiment 1. Proportion of ‘regular’ responses as a 
function of the timing of the final stimulus in the sequence for (a) sequences of small jitter and (b) sequences 
of large jitter. Each line represents a different temporal jitter applied to the stimuli around an IOI of 700 ms. 
The distribution of responses becomes steeper with less relative jitter for both (A) small jitter and (b) large 
jitter sequences (interaction term of two-way repeated measures ANOVA on the inverse-normal proportion 
of ‘regular’ responses bounded between .01 and .99: Small jitter: F42,378=3.5, p<.0001, ηp²=.28; Large jitter: 
F42,378=5.0, p<.0001, ηp²=.36). Asterisks denote anisochronies at which the proportion of responses differs 
significantly across temporal jitters evidencing more irregular responses when a stimulus sequence is more 
jittered. See Supplementary Table 3.1 and 3.2 for statistical tests). In all graphs, error bars represent the 
standard error of the mean.  
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Supplementary Table 3.1. Analysis of the ‘regular’ responses at each anisochrony for different magnitudes 
of jitter in Experiment 1. F values and Bonferroni-corrected p values (p values are multiplied by 15) for one-
way r.m. ANOVA on the proportion of responses in the four conditions at each level of anisochrony. 
Asterisks denote significant p values at 5% alpha level.  
Anisochrony 
[ms] 
Small Jitter Large Jitter 
F3,27 = p= ηp²= F3,27 =      p= ηp²= 
-200 0.7 >0.99 0.07 	   4.2  0.228 0.32	  
-150 0.3  >0.99 0.04	   0.7  >0.99 0.07 	  
-100 0.1  >0.99 0.02 7.1 *0.017 0.44	  
-80 1.2 >0.99 0.12  11.9 *0.001 0.57 	  
-60 12.3  *0.001 0.58 	   25.5 *0.001 0.74 	  
-40 4.3 0.198  0.32	   37.0 *0.001	   0.80 	  
-20 14.0 *0.001  0.61 25.2 *0.001  0.74	  
0 7.1  *0.017  0.44 24.4  *0.001 0.73 	  
20 6.1  *0.039 0.40	   32.7  *0.001 0.78 	  
40 12.1 *0.001  0.57 	   26.0  *0.001 0.74 	  
60 6.7  *0.023  0.43 	   38.8 *0.001 0.81 	  
80 0.1 >0.99  0.01 	   12.8 *0.001 0.59	  
100 1.4  >0.99 0.14 	   9.4 *0.003 0.51	  
150 0.2  >0.99 0.02	   4.3 0.208 0.32 	  
200 3.4  0.473  0.28 0.2 >.99 0.02 
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Supplementary Table 3.2. Analysis of the “regular” responses at each anisochrony comparing 0ms 
(isochronous) jitter between the groups exposed to small and large jitter Experiment 1. T values and 
Bonferroni-corrected p values (values are multiplied by 15) for independent-sample t-tests on the proportion 
of responses between the two groups at each level of anisochrony. Asterisks denote significant p values at 
5% alpha level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Anisochrony 
[ms] 
0ms Jitter – Difference between 
Small and Large Groups 
T18 = p= 
-200 -0.6 0.556 
-150 -0.1 0.237 
-100 -0.3 0.760 
-80 -0.3 0.778 
-60 -0.4 0.671 
-40 -2.6 *0.019 
-20 -3.9 *0.001 
0 -2.1 *0.047 
20 -2.5 *0.021 
40 -1.2 0.242 
60 -0.6 0.546 
80 -0.1 0.922 
100 -1.0 0.336 
150 -0.4 0.680 
200 0.5 0.567 
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Supplementary Figure 3.2. Illustration of the proportion of regular responses without additional 
anisochrony of the last stimulus as a function of the temporal jitter in the sequence for both the regular 
environment (blue line) and irregular environment (red line). 
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Supplementary Figure 3.3. Additional analysis for the results of Experiment 2. Average PSS values 
corresponding to the SOA at which both the audio and visual stimulus were perceived as simultaneous. 
Positive PSS values indicate that the light needs to be presented before the sound to be perceived as 
simultaneous whilst negative values indicate that the sound has to be presented before the light to be 
perceived as simultaneous. PSS values should be horizontal and not change if the stimulus anisochrony does 
not affect the perceived timing, but instead, the PSS values only change for 0ms jitter in the (a) small jitter 
group whilst no such change is exhibited in the (b) large jitter group (Interaction term of two-way repeated 
measures ANOVA for factors of anisochrony and jitter level in the small jitter group: F3,33=1.2, p=.33, 
ηp²=.10. Main effect Anisochrony: F1,11=8.5, p=.01, ηp²=.43,Main effect Jitter: F3,33=3.6, p<.02, ηp²=.25. 
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Supplementary Figure 3.4. Additional analysis of Experiment 2. JND values for small and large jitter group 
as a function of each anisochrony. The JND represents how well participants can discriminate between the 
audio and visual stimulus. A change in JND would suggest that the jitter was hampering their ability to 
discriminate between the stimuli and thus possibly cause changes in the PSS but we find no such effects as a 
two-way repeated measures ANOVA on anisochrony and temporal jitter for both the regular and irregular 
context groups revealed no main effects of an interaction (all p >.1). 
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Chapter 4 Bayesian Time Perception: Prior 
Expectations and Noisy Sensory Estimates 
Bias Perceived Timing 
Here, we tested further intrinsic properties of the Bayesian model. In particular, we test how noise 
characteristics of stimuli can affect the perceived timing of stimuli. 
 
4.1 Abstract 
We propose a model of perceived timing where the brain represents stimuli as probability 
distributions over time. An inherent characteristic of this model is that perceived timing of 
low-intensity signals should be influenced more by a-priori expectations about the timing 
of stimuli more than signals of high intensity. To test this model prediction, we presented 
sequences of regularly timed auditory stimuli (isochronous sequences) with alternating 
amplitudes (low–high–low–…). Such a sequence generates an expectation that stimuli 
should be regular, but here the final stimulus of the sequence was instead presented 
slightly earlier or later than expected. The participant’s task was to report the temporal 
order of the final stimulus compared to a visual probe presented with varying stimulus 
onset asynchronies. We find that perceived simultaneity of stimuli changes suggesting that 
early stimuli are delayed and late stimuli are accelerated. Furthermore, we find that 
perceived timing of low intensity stimuli are regularized more so than for high intensity 
stimuli, in line with the idea that the brain uses Bayesian priors about stimulus timing for 
perception.  
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4.2 Author Summary 
How does the brain work out the timing of events? Sequences of regularly timed stimuli 
can inform us about the probable timing of future events. We hypothesized that the brain 
uses a Bayesian inference process that tracks such regularities with dynamic prior 
expectations to predict the timing of future events. Perception is determined from the 
combination of temporal expectations with current sensory evidence. This framework 
suggests that stimuli with slight deviations from temporal regularity should be biased 
towards expectations and further, that stimuli whose timing is uncertain should be 
regularized even more. In order to test this prediction, we introduce a paradigm that 
measures the perceived timing of a stimulus in a sequence. We find that earlier- and later- 
than expected stimuli are temporally regularized and as predicted, we find that less reliable 
stimuli are more regularized. Together, the data and model suggest a parsimonious 
explanation of time perception and provide further evidence that perception is the result of 
Bayesian inference.  
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4.3 Introduction 
The environment is constantly evolving around us, providing a stream of sensory 
information that the brain has to process, analyse and respond to. The task of efficiently 
managing this information is important to survival. One way the brain can increase 
efficiency is to take advantage of temporal regularities in the world, which leads to 
decreased neural metabolic consumption (VanRullen & Dubois, 2011),  and in 
automatizing rhythmic behaviour for activities like speech, music production, tapping and 
dance (McNeill, 1995; Repp, 2005). The simplest type of temporal regularity in the 
environment is the occurrence of repeated stimuli with the same inter-onset interval (IOI). 
The brain can use the regularity derived from regular sequences to improve stimulus 
detection and discrimination (Brochard et al., 2013; Carnevale et al., 2015; Correa et al., 
2005; Cravo et al., 2013; Escoffier et al., 2010; Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010; Rohenkohl & 
Nobre, 2011) and to drive faster responses (Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010; Lakatos et al., 2008; 
Miyazaki et al., 2005). However, the neural mechanisms that underpin how the brain can 
estimate event timing remain unknown. Here we propose that the brain rapidly generates 
temporal expectations about future stimuli and uses such expectations to bias perception in 
a way that leads to the temporal regularization of slightly irregular stimulus sequences. 
Humans make decisions about temporal properties all the time. We can estimate 
how much time has passed since a movie started, what the current time is, and how fast 
objects are moving. However, humans do not perceive time veridically (Allan, 1979; 
Grondin, 2010), and as such there is inherent inaccuracy in temporal judgments.  The 
perceived timing of a stimulus – the point at which an event is thought to have occurred – 
has a limited resolution. Temporal processing is subdivided into discrete epochs: two 
stimuli occurring within a processing epoch will be judged as simultaneous, whilst 
reported as sequential if occurred within two or more epochs (Hirsh & Sherrick, 1961; 
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Kristofferson, 1967; VanRullen & Koch, 2003). Given the limits of perceptual accuracy in 
the dimension of time, here we consider such distortions in the perceived timing of stimuli 
in isochronous sequences and we propose a Bayesian model that explains how the brain 
may deal with such an intrinsic problem in arriving at a percept of time.  
Whilst temporal accuracy is limited, the uncertainty of the time at which a signal 
arrives after being produced adds another layer of complexity into forming a percept of 
time. Uncertainty about the timing of a signal arises from two sources: External noise, i.e. 
from random variability in the compression and rarefaction of longitudinal airwaves; and 
secondly, internal sensory noise from neural transmission and subsequent encoding of 
temporal information (Green & Swets, 1973). Thus, it has been argued that a fundamental 
purpose of the brain is to minimize uncertainty and derive a ‘best guess’ of the state of the 
world (Helmholtz, 1963). 
To arrive at an optimal estimate, it has been proposed that the brain employs 
sensory mechanisms that work in a way consistent with Bayesian Decision Theory (Bayes, 
1763). In Bayesian decision theory an optimal observer for estimating when an event 
occurred can be defined by two probability distributions (Fig. 1a). First, the likelihood 
function 𝑝! 𝑡   is the probability of sensing a stimulus at time t given that the stimulus is 
produced in the environment. Second, the prior probability distribution 𝑝! 𝑡  is the 
knowledge of encountering a stimulus at a time in the future that increases rapidly with 
successive stimulus presentation (Fig. 4.1b). According to Bayes’ rule (Bayes, 1763), the 
multiplication of the prior and likelihood function leads to the formulation of the posterior 
distribution (of which the observer selects a value of t, which commonly equates to the 
mean or mode of the posterior, Fig. 4.1cde). This distribution is then employed to obtain 
the estimate of perceived stimulus timing. Such a framework has been proven consistent 
with human performance in several perceptual domains (Kersten & Yuille, 2003; Knill & 
 82 
Richards, 1996; Mamassian et al., 2002; Petzschner & Glasauer, 2011; Wolpert & 
Ghahramani, 2000), but here we apply it to the temporal dimension, and specifically, the 
perceived timing of stimuli.  
 
 
Figure 4.1. A computational model of perceived timing. (a) Illustration of two likelihood functions that 
describe sensory estimates with (left; red) low noise, and (right; blue) high noise. (b) Dynamic prior 
probability distributions that dynamically increase with each presentation of a stimulus. (c) High and low 
noise stimuli with corresponding likelihood functions that are presented slightly earlier than expected and 
combined with the prior (d) that is biased towards the expected timing (dotted line). (e) Posterior 
distributions show the temporal regularization effect and as such the perceived timing of a high noise 
stimulus is delayed closer to expectation (purple distribution) than a stimulus with low noise (cyan 
distribution). 
 
 From this framework we expect that the prior should bias temporal perception so 
that slightly irregularly timed stimuli are perceived closer to the expected time. 
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Furthermore, an intrinsic property of this model is that the regularization should be 
modulated by the precision of the temporal estimate that can be obtained from a signal. 
Low intensity stimuli have lower signal-to-noise ratio, which should lead to a likelihood 
with a broader distribution and thus a less precise estimate of temporal properties. As such, 
the combination of the likelihood with the prior should lead low intensity stimuli to be 
captured more by the prior and thus to be perceived closer in time to the expected time 
point than high intensity stimuli (Fig. 4.1e; Fig. 4.2c). 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Comparison of predicted models PSS estimates. (a) A Reaction Time (RT) account of temporal 
perception predicts that stimuli that are of high amplitude are processed quicker than stimuli of low 
amplitude whilst Entrainment models (b) predict that stimuli that are consistent with the temporal pattern are 
processed quicker. (c) A Bayesian account of temporal perception, predicts that stimuli of lower amplitude 
are captured more so by a prior distribution and as such early stimuli are delayed towards expectation whilst 
late stimuli are perceptually accelerated – an effect similar to temporal regularization. 
 
In this paper, we aimed to validate such a prediction, showing that prior 
expectations about timing of stimuli bias perception in a way that has not been considered 
previously, as current accounts of time perception (Buhusi & Meck, 2005; Buonomano & 
Merzenich, 1995; Creelman, 1962; Gibbon, 1977; Gibbon et al., 1984; Karmarkar & 
Buonomano, 2007; Meck, 2005; Shi et al., 2013; Teki et al., 2011; Treisman, 1963; van 
Rijn et al., 2014; Wackermann & Ehm, 2006) do not predict changes in the perceived 
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timing of stimuli. Further, we hypothesize that stimuli that are less reliable, and as such 
noisier, should be captured more by prior expectations and therefore temporal 
regularization for them should be stronger. We devised a paradigm that measures the 
perceived timing of a stimulus in a sequence and we find that stimuli with low amplitude 
are perceived closer to regularity whereas the prior less affects stimuli with higher 
amplitude. We were able to reverse engineer the parameters of a Bayesian estimator that 
successfully describes the experimental data in our experiment and gives more credence to 
the idea that the brain is ‘Bayesian’ and uses statistical inference to make a best estimate of 
the world. 
Extant models of time perception do not explicitly make predictions about changes 
in the perceived timing of stimuli however they could be formulated to predict such 
changes. Models based on reaction time (RT), predict that the RT to high intensity stimuli 
is shorter than those of lower intensity (Kohfeld, 1971; Pins & Bonnet, 1996; Ulrich, 
Rinkenauer, & Miller, 1998) – the rationale behind this is that stimuli of high intensity are 
processed quicker. As such, one could predict that stimuli that are high intensity are 
perceived earlier than relatively lower ones (Fig. 4.2a). Entrainment models of time 
perception, on the other hand, assert that the brain adjusts its internal oscillations in a way 
that the peak aligns to the phase of external stimulation (Large & Jones, 1999; Large & 
Palmer, 2002; Large & Snyder, 2009) that is in keeping with an underlying temporal 
pattern. Attentional resources are deployed at the expected time (Henry & Herrmann, 
2014; Rohenkohl & Nobre, 2011) and as such it may be predicted that stimuli that are 
presented consistently in a temporal structure are processed faster in comparison to stimuli 
that are inconsistent with the temporal structure (Fig. 4.2b). Contrastingly, the Bayesian 
model of perceived timing we present in this paper predicts that stimuli with low 
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amplitude should be captured more by the expected timing and as such – regardless of 
sequence consistency – should be perceptually regularized (Fig. 4.2c).   
4.4 Results  
The proposed Bayesian model of perceived timing predicts that slightly irregular stimuli 
should be delayed towards expectation, but stimuli that carry a broader likelihood function 
(more uncertain timing) are comparatively more regularized. We show in this section that 
subjects do change the time at which they perceive a stimulus before fitting a Bayesian 
model of perceived timing to show that changes in the shape of the likelihood function due 
to sensory uncertainty explain the pattern of experimental data. 
4.4.1 Behavioural Experiment 
To investigate both the effect of increasing temporal expectations and temporal noise on 
perceived timing, we presented regularly timed sequences of stimuli with alternating 
amplitude. The intensity of the last stimulus could either be consistent or inconsistent with 
the preceding alternating amplitude (Fig. 4.3). We presented consistent/inconsistent 
sequences in order to control against subjects forming contingent expectations that a low 
intensity stimulus always follows a high stimulus and vice versa. Moreover, the last 
stimulus was presented with a slight conflict compared to the expected timing, i.e. it could 
be earlier than or later than expected (± 40ms). The assumption of this methodology is that 
temporal expectations increase with each successive presentation of each stimulus, 
analogous to the priors as presented in Figure 4.1a. Subjects judged whether the final 
stimulus in the series of seven alternating high/low amplitude stimuli was before or after a 
visual probe stimulus and subjects reported the temporal order of this pair (i.e. was the 
sound or light first?). 
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Figure 4.3. Schematic of the Experimental Procedure. Subjects were presented a sequence of isochronous 
stimuli that alternated in amplitude. The subjects’ task was to report the temporal order of the audiovisual 
pair of stimuli at the end of the sequence. A Positive SOA indicates that the light was presented before the 
final auditory stimulus. The final stimulus in the sequence could be (a) a ‘high’ amplitude stimulus that was 
consistent with the sequence (example: negative anisochrony, negative SOA), (b) a ‘high’ amplitude 
stimulus that was inconsistent with the sequence (example: positive anisochrony, negative SOA), (c) a ‘low’ 
amplitude consistent with the sequence (example: positive anisochrony, positive SOA) or, (d) a ‘low’ 
amplitude stimulus that was inconsistent with the sequence (example: negative anisochrony, positive SOA). 
 
We calculated the proportion of ‘light first’ responses as a function of the physical 
difference in timing between the final auditory stimulus and the probe (SOAs). We 
considered the combination of three independent variables: whether the intensity of the 
final stimulus was consistent or inconsistent with the sequence, whether the stimulus was 
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of low or high amplitude, and whether the final stimulus was presented earlier or later than 
expected. From these psychometric functions obtained in each of these 8 conditions we 
find the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between the final stimulus and visual probe 
necessary for the Perception of Subjective Simultaneity (PSS; see Materials and Methods), 
that is, the SOA that corresponds to where subjects are maximally unsure about whether 
the auditory or visual stimulus was first. Consequently, the PSS allows us to capture the 
perceived timing of the repeated stimulus – and subsequent changes in the PSS as a 
function of the anisochrony at which it is presented tells us that the the brain may 
regularize temporally deviant stimuli. 
Figure 4.4a presents the average PSS values of each condition as a function of 
whether the final stimulus was earlier or later than expected. The PSS values for each 
condition were assessed using repeated-measures ANOVA with factors anisochrony, 
sequence consistency, and amplitude of final stimulus. We found a difference in the 
perceived timing between early and late stimuli (main effect: Anisochrony; F(1,17)=20.6, 
p=.0003, ηp²=.55). The comparison of PSS values between early and late presentation for 
each condition suggests that late stimuli are perceived faster (accelerated) whilst early 
stimuli are perceived slower (delayed). Thus, the perceived timing of stimuli is changed to 
regularize small temporal deviations. Critically, this effect is modulated by the amplitude 
of the final stimulus (interaction term of anisochrony and stimulus amplitude; F(1,17)=7.9, 
p=.012, ηp²=.33; (Fig. 4.5) with no effect of sequence consistency (interaction term of 
sequence consistency and anisochrony, F(1,17)=0.5, p=.49, ηp²=.01 (Fig. 4). 
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Figure 4.4. Subjects’ Average PSS and Weights. (a) Subject’s average PSS values corresponding to the 
Stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) that visual and auditory stimuli are perceived as being simultaneous. A 
positive PSS indicates that light must be presented before the sound in order to be perceived as simultaneous. 
The difference between the PSS values of early (-40ms) and late (40ms) anisochronies on the X-axis 
indicates whether a change in perceived timing was evidenced. If there were not a change in perceived 
timing then the pattern of PSS for each condition would be horizontal. However, we find that only when the 
final stimulus is low intensity there is then a change in perceived timing (red lines). As the light has to be 
presented further in advance of the auditory stimulus to be perceived as simultaneous for late stimuli, this 
evidences a perceptual acceleration. When the asynchrony diminishes between the light and sound, then this 
evidences a perceptual delay – this is shown for early stimuli. The difference in the PSS values is reflected in 
(b) where the effect size (and as such the relative weights) show a strong change in perceived timing for 
when the final stimulus is of low amplitude. 
  
To quantify the magnitude of the regularization effect, we calculated the effect size 
(𝐸!) given to the a-priori expectation with low and high intensity signals: 
 𝐸! = !""!"#$%∙  !""!"#$!"  (Eq. 4.1) 
where i indexes the effect size given to a sequence for each of the four conditions and 𝑃𝑆𝑆!"#$% refers to the PSS when the final stimulus was -40ms earlier than expected 
whereas   𝑃𝑆𝑆!"#$ is when the final stimulus was 40ms later than expected. The 
multiplication of these values is then divided by 80ms; which is the temporal difference 
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between both conditions. As such, the effect size represents how much the final stimulus 
likelihood is attracted by the prior. Figure 4.4B displays the calculated effect sizes for the 
expected time point in all conditions whereas Figure 4.5B illustrates the effect sizes when 
sequence consistency is collapsed. The effect sizes are significantly differed from 0 for the 
low amplitude stimuli, but they are not for high amplitude stimuli (single sample t-test, 
t(17)=5.3, p<.001; t(17)=1.5, p= 0.16). Furthermore, the two weights differ from each 
other suggesting that perceived timing of signals with lower intensity are more biased 
towards the expected time point (paired sample t-test, t(17)=-2.8, p=.012). 
 
 
Figure 4.5. Collapsed PSS and Effect Sizes for High versus Low Intensity Final Stimuli and Model 
Predictions. (a) Subject’s average PSS values corresponding to the Stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) that 
visual and auditory stimuli are perceived as being simultaneous. A positive PSS indicates that light must be 
presented before the sound in order to be perceived as simultaneous. The difference between the PSS values 
of early (-40ms) and late (40ms) anisochronies on the X-axis indicates whether a change in perceived timing 
was evidenced. If there were not a change in perceived timing then the pattern of PSS for each condition 
would be horizontal. However, we find that only when the final stimulus is low intensity then there is a 
change in perceived timing (red lines). As the light has to be presented further in advance of the auditory 
stimulus to be perceived as simultaneous for late stimuli, this evidences a perceptual acceleration. When the 
asynchrony diminishes between the light and sound, then this evidences a perceptual delay – this is shown 
for early stimuli. The difference in the PSS values is reflected in (b) where the effect size show a strong 
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change in perceived timing for when the final stimulus is of low amplitude. Error bars represent the standard 
error of the mean. 
4.4.2 Bayesian Decision Theory Model 
Subjects’ performance was modelled with Bayesian Decision Theory (BDT). This 
framework has been applied to different perceptual domains (Kersten & Yuille, 2003; 
Knill & Richards, 1996; Mamassian et al., 2002; Petzschner & Glasauer, 2011; Wolpert & 
Ghahramani, 2000) including temporal interval estimation (Hartcher-O'Brien et al., 2014; 
Shi et al., 2013) and reproduction (Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010; Miyazaki et al., 2005). To 
conceptualize, we suggest that the brain represents the probability of experiencing stimuli 
at every time point. The likelihood 𝑝! 𝑡  represents current sensory information and as 
such the time a stimulus was sensed at time 𝑡  given it was produced in the environment. A 
Gaussian distribution with mean 𝜇  and variance σ! is used to describe the likelihood and 
noise (uncertainty) in sensory latency. The prior 𝑝! 𝑡  represents the a-priori knowledge 
of the future timing of a stimulus. According to BDT, the likelihood 𝑝! 𝑡  and prior 
probabilities 𝑝! 𝑡   can be combined at each time point (Eq. 4.1), giving rise to the 
posterior probability from which a percept is obtained 𝑝! 𝑡 :  
 𝑝! 𝑡 ∝ 𝑝! 𝑡 ∙   𝑝! 𝑡    (Eq. 4.2) 
Similar to a Kalman filter, the prior is dynamic and recursively updates after each stimulus 
presentation by using the posterior probability 𝑝! 𝑡   for the previous stimulus (i.e., 𝑝! 𝑡   for the time t-IOI'). The mean of the prior corresponds to the point a stimulus is 
expected to be sensed. The a-priori probability of a stimulus is modelled to be flat when 
the first stimulus is presented but increases after each stimulus presentation. This is 
expressed by:  
  𝑝! 𝑡 + 𝐼𝑂𝐼′ ∝ 𝑝! 𝑡 + 𝜔  (Eq. 4.3) 
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As more information is acquired, the prior builds and begins to approach the shape of the 
likelihood function after a few stimulus presentations until it eventually eclipses it and 
becomes less broad and steeper. The added constant ω leads to a heavy-tailed prior that 
allows for abrupt changes in IOI and as such decreases the tendency of entirely 
assimilating the posterior into a new prior (Roach et al., 2006). It follows that when the 
likelihood is displaced from the mean of the prior – the posterior is biased towards the 
prior. Further, if the likelihood function becomes less reliable (has a greater variance), then 
it is biased more towards the prior than a likelihood function with comparatively greater 
reliability.  
4.4.3 Likelihood and Prior Estimation from Experimental Data 
From the experimental data, we find that stimuli of low amplitude (i.e. less reliability / 
lower signal to noise ratio) are biased by the prior distribution more so than stimuli of 
higher amplitude (Fig. 4.4 and 4.5). We then determined the parameters of the proposed 
model that best fit such data. It should be observed that the model has only two 
parameters: 𝜔 and sigma, the variance of the likelihood function. We obtained 𝜔 and 
found σ!!  for the high intensity and σ!! for the low intensity stimuli using a grid search over 
the parameter space that produce a shift in PSS’ in the model that is similar to the one we 
registered experimentally. 
To obtain the predicted PSS' for each participant in each condition, we simulated the 
probability distributions for each of the stimuli presented in the sequence. For this, we 
applied Equations 4.2 and 3 iteratively alternating σ!!   and σ!!  for the likelihoods of the 
high and low intensity stimuli, whilst adding the constant 𝜔 at each iteration. We then 
cumulate the posterior probability distributions for the last stimulus in the sequence. The 
50% point is the PSS'. We jointly determine 𝜔, σ!!  and σ!!   that minimize the difference 
with the empirical PSS for each participant. We obtain average values of σ!!  = 
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66.5000±0.6239ms for a high intensity stimulus and σ!! = 379.9444±0.5024ms for a low 
intensity stimulus, and 𝜔 as 0.0118±0.0031. We present the model PSS' with the best-fit 
parameters in comparison to the empirical PSS in Figure 4.5A, and the resultant weights in 
Figure 4.5B. We find that the model PSS accurately captures the pattern of empirical data 
in a way consistent with predictions of the model – the best fitting parameters yield that 
low amplitude stimuli have an increased standard deviation of the likelihood function 
governing it, whilst the high amplitude likelihood function is best fit with a Gaussian 
distribution with a smaller standard deviation.  
4.5 Discussion 
Our results demonstrate that a Bayesian estimator model can accurately capture subjects’ 
data in a human perceived timing task. We find that slightly irregularly timed stimuli are 
regularized to be perceived closer to expectation. Critically, we find that stimuli with low 
amplitude have strong regularization in comparison to stimuli with high amplitude. In 
accordance to the model detailed in the introduction and results section – we find the 
pattern of results best fits a Bayesian model of perceived timing interpretation in 
comparison to models based on reaction time or entrainment.  
The proposed Bayesian model is based on the dynamic updating of temporal 
expectations after each presentation of a stimulus. Temporal expectations are combined 
iteratively with noisy internal representations of current sensory information, which results 
in the perceived timing of stimuli. The model can be utilized as a tool to fit human 
perceived timing data in perceptual decision tasks that are based on the method of constant 
stimuli as well as serving as an antecedent for future scientific inquiry into temporal 
perception. 
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4.5.1 Validation of Model Predictions 
The model makes two primary predictions that we subsequently validated with empirical 
data. Firstly, the model implicitly predicts that stimuli that are presented slightly earlier or 
later than expected should be captured by prior expectations in a way that regularizes their 
perceived timing. Secondly, implicit in the model, is that shallower likelihood functions 
should be dominated more by the prior and as such we should see a strong effect of 
temporal regularization when a low intensity stimulus is the final temporally deviant 
stimulus. 
 To test these predictions, we devised a paradigm that allowed us to precisely 
measure the perceived timing of stimuli whilst varying the intensity of the final stimulus. 
To do this, we presented a sequence of stimuli with alternating amplitudes (low–high–
low–…). The use of alternating amplitudes allows us to disentangle the signal reliability of 
the prior and likelihood functions – as the prior is based on the recursive updating of itself 
given the posterior of the previous stimulus. A sequence of identical stimuli cannot 
disentangle the prior from the likelihood function and as such it would be hard to conclude 
anything concrete about whether the prior or likelihood caused the changes in perceived 
timing reported in this paper. 
To precisely measure perceived timing, the final stimulus was paired with a visual 
probe and subjects’ were asked to report the temporal order of this pair (Figure 4.1). Such 
a method allows us to calculate the Point of Subjective Simultaneity (PSS) of the final 
repeated stimulus. In order to validate the predictions of our model, we altered the timing 
of the last stimulus so it could be earlier or later than expected. Such an alteration in the 
physical timing should result in a change in the PSS in a way that means that stimuli 
presented earlier than expected are perceptually delayed, whilst stimuli presented later than 
expected are perceptually accelerated. The objective synchrony of audiovisual stimuli 
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differs markedly to the perceived synchrony in the brain. Sound and light differ in their 
propagation velocity from source to sense organ, but also differ in their processing and 
transduction times in the brain (Allison et al., 1977; A. J. King, 2005; Spence & Squire, 
2003; Sternberg & Knoll, 1973). As such, it is often reported that a visual stimulus should 
precede an auditory one in order to be perceived as simultaneous (Allison et al., 1977; A. 
J. King, 2005; Spence & Squire, 2003; Zampini et al., 2003) – the PSS. An increase in the 
time that a visual stimulus precedes an auditory stimulus to be perceived as simultaneous 
exemplifies a perceptual acceleration of the auditory stimulus, however a reduction in the 
asynchrony means that the auditory stimulus is perceptually delayed. Our data shows an 
effect consistent with temporal regularization and the predictions of our model – as final 
stimuli with low amplitude are perceptually delayed (reduced vision-audio PSS) if they are 
presented earlier than expected and perceptually accelerated (increased vision-audio PSS) 
if they are later than expected.  
4.5.2 Interpretation to Existing Models of Temporal Perception 
Timing can be conceptualized as meaning both how long an event lasted, or contrastingly, 
when an event occurred (Merchant & de Lafuente, 2014). Historically, both interval 
(Gibbon et al., 1984; Treisman, 1963) and entrainment (Buonomano & Merzenich, 1995; 
Karmarkar & Buonomano, 2007; Large & Jones, 1999; C. Miall, 1989) accounts of time 
perception are concerned with how long a discrete duration is perceived to have lasted, and 
as such are not concerned with changes in the perceived timing of the stimuli that delimit 
such intervals. Rather, they predict changes in the perceived duration between two events 
and that sensitivity to temporal irregularities increases as a function of the number of 
intervals in a sequence (Large & Palmer, 2002; Schulze, 1989).  
In reaction time (RT) models, Faster RTs are elicited by stimuli with higher 
stimulus intensities (Cattell, 1886; Chocholle, 1940; Kohfeld, 1971). Stimuli with lower 
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amplitude are slower to respond to and harder to detect due to the increased noise in the 
estimate and as such, are perceived later than higher amplitude stimuli (Piéron, 1913; 
1952; Pins & Bonnet, 1996). Interval-models, such as the extensively researched Scalar 
Expectancy Theory (SET), consider duration perception as the accumulation of pulses 
from a pacemaker per unit of time (Church et al., 1994; Gibbon, 1977; Gibbon et al., 
1984). In this framework, more intense stimuli increase the rate of an internal pacemaker 
leading to longer duration estimates but faster reaction times. The prediction therefore is 
solely based on the fact that signal intensity should increase the processing speed of high 
intensity signals (Fig. 4.2a).  
In the data of this experiment, however, we find that stimuli of lower amplitude are 
perceived faster than high amplitude stimuli if a stimulus is presented later than expected 
(Fig. 4.5). In concert with the RT accounts, we find that low amplitude stimuli are 
perceived slower than high amplitude stimuli when presented earlier than expected. A 
prior representing expected timing could explain such an effect – which has not been 
considered in RT or SET models. The prior regularizes slightly deviant stimuli but 
captures stimuli with low amplitude more and, as such, indicates that such stimuli may 
have a shallower likelihood function underlying them. 
 Entrainment models, on the other hand, assert that internal oscillators adjust to the 
frequency and phase of external stimulation (Jones & Boltz, 1989; Large & Palmer, 2002; 
Large & Snyder, 2009). Given the entrained pattern, exogenous attention is deployed at the 
expected time (Henry & Herrmann, 2014; Rohenkohl et al., 2011). The rhythmic 
deployment of attentional resources at the expected time results in a prior-entry style effect 
(Spence & Parise, 2010) resulting in perceptual acceleration of stimuli that occur 
consistently in the observed temporal pattern (Fig. 4.2b). We find, however, that weak 
signals irrespective of their sequence consistency are actually delayed when presented 
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slightly earlier than expected. Our data, therefore suggest that entrainment models need to 
incorporate the effect of temporal regularization into temporal processing as they only 
appeal to perceptual acceleration of stimuli.  
4.5.3  Future Directions 
Unlike previous Bayesian models investigating the perception of duration (Jazayeri & 
Shadlen, 2010; Miyazaki et al., 2005; Shi et al., 2013), this paper, elucidates how the brain 
can formulate an estimate of when an event occurred. As such, the Bayesian model of 
perceived timing makes explicit predictions that require further scientific inquiry and 
testing. 
The model is based on the idea that temporal expectations (the priors) build 
iteratively based on the repeated presentation of isochronous intervals. As such, if 
sequences of anisochronous stimuli are presented, then the prior should not be built within 
a sequence and as such, should not bias the timing of stimuli. Further, we find in the 
natural environment that a variety of signals that can be expected – but don’t arrive 
isochronously – i.e. the first three intervals of a sequence could are 500ms whilst the 
fourth is always 800ms. Are prior expectations limited to isochronous, rhythmic 
presentation or are they built hierarchically? Or does the temporal context influence the 
perception of such things as regularity or perceived timing. Further, do multiple priors 
develop over multiple temporal patterns? Neural oscillations in the brain offer an 
interesting way of representing such priors, as the phase of delta-theta band activity could 
be a plausible neurophysiological mechanism for their implementation (Arnal & Giraud, 
2012; Arnal, Doelling, & Poeppel, 2014) as well thalamo-cortico-striatal circuits that have 
also been showed to encode interval timing as well as numerosity (Buhusi & Meck, 2005; 
Matell & Meck, 2004). Bayesian inference has been shown to operate at the neural level 
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(Ma, Beck, Latham, & Pouget, 2006), thus developing a neurophysiological model of 
temporal perception is paramount in understanding how the brain may perceive time. 
In this paper, we used repeated auditory stimuli to build temporal expectations– to 
further characterize this model; one may present stimuli from different modalities. The 
temporal acuity of visual stimuli, for example, is known to be less than for auditory stimuli 
(Hartcher-O'Brien et al., 2014) – as such, one could posit that the likelihood function that 
represents visual information is broader than for auditory stimuli: does the prior still build 
within-modality or is it amodal? One could devise an experiment whereby presenting 
interleaved sequences of different modalities and measuring the perceived timing of 
stimuli may help clarify such a position. 
To further characterize the temporal profile of the regularization effect for 
temporally deviant stimuli, the next key step would be to present a range of anisochronies 
of the final stimulus and understand at what point stimuli are not regularized, as well as 
seeing if such an effect is symmetrical around 0 anisochrony (on-time stimuli). One might 
consider that stimuli presented at the expected time are not regularized – as two Gaussian 
probability distributions i.e. a prior and likelihood as per the Bayesian model with identical 
means, result in a posterior distribution with the same mean – and as such, no change in 
perceived timing. However, if we consider the concepts of prior entry (Spence & Parise, 
2010) and active sensing (Schroeder et al., 2010; Schroeder & Lakatos, 2009), one could 
posit that expected stimuli are actually perceptually accelerated. The waxing and waning 
of excitation/inhibition cycles in the active sensing framework, where high excitability 
phases of neural processing phase are representations of the peak of an attentional pulse, 
facilitate sensory selection and processing of stimuli that coincide within such excitation 
phases (Henry & Herrmann, 2014; Lakatos et al., 2008). Therefore, one can reason that if a 
stimulus occurs at the expected time, and as such the high excitability phase, then it should 
 98 
be given a perceptual boost and processed faster. This type of effect, is similar to prior 
entry (Spence & Parise, 2010; Sternberg et al., 1971), where stimuli that are attended are 
processed faster than unattended ones. Similar ‘Anti-Bayesian’ percepts have recently 
been described with asymmetric likelihood functions (Wei & Stocker, 2012; 2015). As 
such, when applied to time perception and the anisotropic nature of temporal processing, 
such asymmetric functions may serve as a basis for the notion of the repulsion of a 
stimulus away from the expected time. 
4.5.4  Conclusion 
We have presented a novel Bayesian model for the perception of event-timing based on the 
iterative combination of prior expectations about the future timing of stimuli with noisy 
internal representations of current sensory information. We have also introduced a novel 
experimental paradigm that precisely measures the perceived timing of stimuli in repeating 
sequences. The model accurately captures the pattern of results reported in this paper, as 
we find that those stimuli that are presented slightly out of time are regularized so to 
appear more on time. The model makes further novel predictions that can be tested with 
future scientific inquiry as well as the possibility of being tied to plausible neurobiological 
mechanisms for the processing of temporal information.  
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4.6 Materials and Methods  
4.6.1 Subjects 
Eighteen undergraduate students were recruited via the University of Birmingham student 
research participation system. All subjects gave written consent before taking part in the 
experiment and all reported normal or corrected-to-normal hearing and vision. All subjects 
were naïve to the purpose of the experiment and were given course credits or were paid 6 
pounds. The experiment was given ethical approval by the University of Birmingham 
Ethics Committee.  
4.6.2 Stimuli 
The auditory stimuli were tones produced by a speaker positioned 50 cm to the left of the 
participant (20 ms, with a 5 ms linear ramp). Stimuli were all the same pitch (frequency of 
1 kHz) but differed between ‘low’ and ‘high’ amplitudes. A low stimulus (A) had an 
amplitude of 37.55 dBA, whilst a high amplitude stimulus (B) was 75.1 dBA. Visual 
stimuli were flashes produced by a red 5-mm LED positioned in front of the participant 
(20 ms with 5 ms linear ramp, 91 Cd/m2). 
4.6.3 Behavioural Task 
Subjects sat approximately 50 cm from a custom-made light and sound device in a quiet, 
well-lit room. Subjects were presented with a sequence of seven auditory stimuli with an 
ISI of 400 ms except the last stimulus that had a temporal deviation of ±40 ms. The last 
auditory stimulus could be (1) consistent with the sequence/ low amplitude (ABABABA), 
(2) consistent with the sequence/ high amplitude (BABABAB), (3) inconsistent with the 
sequence/ low amplitude (BABABAA) or (4) inconsistent with the sequence / high 
amplitude (ABABABB).  The final stimulus was presented together with a visual stimulus 
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with SOAs of 0, ±40, ±80, ±120, or ±200 ms (It is important to note that an SOA of 0 is 
locked to the temporal deviation of the final repeated stimulus). Subjects performed a two-
alternative forced choice (2AFC) temporal-order judgment (TOJ; did the light or sound 
come first?) task on the audiovisual pair appearing at the end of the sequence. All 
conditions were interleaved and the next trial would begin 1.5 or 2 s after the response key 
was pressed. Each condition was presented 6 times in order to construct a psychometric 
function. 
4.6.4 Psychometric Function 
For each participant a psychometric function was established by relating the cumulative 
proportion of responses in the TOJ task. In order to see a shift in the perceived timing of 
stimuli, the point of subjective simultaneity (PSS) derived from a psychometric function 
was of great interest. We define the PSS as the SOA at which each subject was equally 
likely to respond that the final repeated stimulus or visual probe stimulus was first. 
Negative PSS values indicate that sound had to be presented before light for them to be 
perceived synchronous whilst positive values mean that light had to be presented before 
sound to be perceived as synchronous. Using the Spearman-Kärber method the PSS and 
JND were estimated as the first and second moments of the psychometric function 
differential across SOAs (see Miller & Ulrich, 2001 for more detail). This method is a non-
parametric estimation that does not make assumptions about the distributions underlying 
the psychometric functions observed. A mathematical derivation of the method can be 
expressed as follows. First we define SOAi with i={1, ... 15} as the 15 values of SOA used 
in the experiments and pi with {i=1, … 15} as the associated proportion of ‘light first’ 
responses. We further define SOA0 =-250 ms, SOA16 =+250 ms, p0=0, and p16=1, to be able 
to compute the intermediate SOA between two successive ones:  
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 𝑠! =    !"#!!!!!"#!! , with i={0, ... 15}  (Eq. 4.5) 
and the corresponding values of the difference in proportion, taken at and above 0 to 
monotonize the proportion of responses  
  𝑑𝑝! = 𝑚𝑎𝑥  (0, 𝑝!!! − 𝑝!) ,  with i={0, ... 15} (Eq. 4.6) 
With these indexes we can express PSS analytically as:  
 
   𝑃𝑆𝑆 =    !!"!!"!!!    𝑠!𝑑𝑝!!"!!!   (Eq. 4.7) 
And the JND as: 
 𝐽𝑁𝐷 =    𝑑𝑝!(𝑠! − 𝑃𝑆𝑆)!!"!!!   (Eq. 4.8) 
Data was not analyzed if subjects had a JND above 250 ms or if PSS exceeded ± 175 ms 
when data was collapsed across conditions. The data of 5 participants were not analysed.  
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Chapter 5 General Discussion and 
Conclusions 
The work presented in this thesis sought to understand the computational mechanisms 
underpinning the perceived timing of events in sequences. In particular, our goal was to 
shift the focus of time perception models away from perceived duration to perceived event 
timing. In this Chapter, I will summarize the main findings of each empirical Chapter, 
show how they contribute to the literature and explain how they improve our 
understanding of time perception. 
5.1 Summary of Main Findings 
5.1.1 Chapter 2: A Bayesian Model of Perceived Timing 
The perceived timing of when an event occurred has often been overlooked in the literature 
of temporal perception. Numerous studies have sought to understand how discrimination 
performance to temporal irregularities increases as the amount of stimuli increases (Drake 
& Botte, 1993; Halpern & Darwin, 1982; ten Hoopen et al., 2011; Lunney, 1974; McAuley 
& Kidd, 1998; Miller & McAuley, 2005). In a first experiment, we tested such a prediction 
by asking participants to report whether the last stimulus (the stimulus could be earlier or 
later than expected) in a sequence of isochronous tones was ‘on time’ – or not.  In contrast 
to the predictions made by the literature, we show that the increase in irregularity 
discrimination as a function of the amount of stimuli in a sequence is asymmetric – stimuli 
presented earlier than expected are better identified as irregular with increasing sequence 
length compared to stimuli appearing later than expected.  
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As a possible explanation for this asymmetry, we hypothesized that changes in the 
perceived timing of the final stimulus could account for the pattern of results. To measure 
the perceived timing of the final stimulus, we presented a sequence of isochronous tones 
where the final tone was paired with a stimulus in another modality. From the participants’ 
responses, we calculated the PSS: the audiovisual asynchrony necessary to perceive both 
stimuli as simultaneous. We found that if the final stimulus was presented a little earlier 
than expected – then the perceived timing is changed in a way that delays the stimulus 
towards its expected timing. Conversely, we found that stimuli presented a little later than 
expected are perceptually accelerated towards expectation. The effect of stimuli being 
delayed towards the time they are expected can be understood as a temporal regularization 
– which is similar to central tendency effects in the time perception literature, such as 
Vierordt’s Law (Lejeune & Wearden, 2009; Vierordt, 1868), where the duration of an 
interval is biased by the average duration of intervals previously experienced (Jazayeri & 
Shadlen, 2010; Petzschner et al., 2015). However, in opposition to a central tendency 
effect, we found asymmetries also in the perceived timing data of stimuli presented at their 
expected time (on time), as they are perceptually accelerated away from expectation.  
 We present a novel Bayesian model based on the dynamic updating of temporal 
expectations that can explain the asymmetries in the detection of irregularity and in the 
perceived timing of stimuli. In our model, perceived timing (the posterior distribution) is 
the result of combining the time you sense a stimulus (likelihood) with the time you expect 
to sense it (prior) – at each point in time. As opposed to current Bayesian accounts of time 
perception that use Gaussian probability distributions (Hartcher-O'Brien et al., 2014; 
Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010; Miyazaki et al., 2006; Shi et al., 2013), the key tenet of our 
model is the relaxation of the assumption of normality in the probability distributions. We 
propose that probability distributions in the temporal domain are necessarily asymmetric 
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due to the way time flows. The anisotropic nature of time means that evidence 
accumulated about stimulus timing for the likelihood function can only start after a short 
delay due to neural processing – but although a stimulus cannot be sensed before a 
stimulus is presented – however there is always the chance it could be perceived a bit later 
than on average due to noise in the sensory system. Prior distributions about the expected 
timing of future events should also be asymmetric, as an organism cannot predict a second 
event to occur before the first event, and as such should start at 0 for when the first event 
occurs and the distribution continues to rise until the expected timing of a second event. 
However, due to the anisotropy of time, the second event could still be expected 
tomorrow, and as such the prior should have a long off tail.  
 Our Bayesian model of perceived timing makes intrinsic predictions that gave rise 
to experiments of Chapters 3 and 4. The first step was to reverse the idea of expectation 
and irregularity to hypothesize that stimuli that are not expected in a sequence i.e. are 
presented in a random sequence of irregular timings, should not have any temporal 
expectations built up. As such, we predicted that the perceived timing of stimuli in an 
environment where trials are isochronous should exhibit the temporal regularization effect 
we presented in Chapter 2 – early stimuli should be delayed towards expectation whilst 
late stimuli should be accelerated. However, stimuli that are presented in an irregular 
environment should not have any modulation of their perceived timing.  
5.1.2 Chapter 3: Temporal Regularity of the Environment Drives Time 
Perception 
The perception of regularity has historically been investigated in terms of deviations from 
its inverse: irregularity (Drake & Botte, 1993; Halpern & Darwin, 1982; Lunney, 1974; 
McAuley & Kidd, 1998; Repp, 1999; Schulze, 1978; 1989; Tanaka, Tsuzaki, Aiba, & 
Kato, 2008). But what makes a sequence of isochronous tones be perceived as regular? 
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Extant models of rhythm perception assume that if a stimulus is presented in an 
isochronous structure then it is simply perceived as such. Time, however, is a physical 
dimension that is often subject to distortion in human perception (Allman & Meck, 2012; 
Hellström & Rammsayer, 2015; ten Hoopen et al., 1995; Horr & Di Luca, 2015a; 2015b; 
Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010; Lejeune & Wearden, 2009; Petzschner et al., 2015; van 
Wassenhove, Buonomano, Shimojo, & Shams, 2008; Wearden et al., 2007); so why 
should a temporal property such as regularity be taken for granted?  
In this Chapter we aimed to test whether the temporal environment could influence 
the perception of regularity. Secondly, we tested a prediction of our Bayesian model of 
perceived timing – if a sequence has temporal irregular events, then the perceived timing 
of a stimulus should not be modulated – as the prior that biased perceived timing cannot be 
built. We find that a regularly-timed environment promotes the perception of regularity 
and changes the perceived timing of stimuli to make slightly irregular stimuli appear more 
regular. An irregular environment of jittered tones, on the other hand, makes perfectly 
regular tones embedded within it be perceived as slightly irregular. 
We interpret these results within the context of our Bayesian model. We suggest 
that in a regular environment, temporal expectations dynamically build after each stimulus 
and subsequently bias the perception of slightly irregular stimuli to make them appear 
more regular. However, in an irregular environment, temporal expectations are less precise 
and as such do not build up, and therefore do not bias the perceived timing of stimuli. As 
the representations are less precise, the posterior distribution from which the perception of 
regularity is taken is wider, and as such there is a chance that an isochronous stimulus is 
perceived as being irregular. It is important to note that the model presented in this and the 
following Chapter (4) uses symmetrical Gaussian distributions. In this instance, we chose 
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such symmetrical distributions to reduce model complexity – but also to give a more 
parsimonious account of the findings in this Chapter. 
5.1.3 Chapter 4: Bayesian Time Perception: Prior Expectations and 
Noisy Sensory Estimates Bias Perceived Timing 
In Chapter 4, we tested an implicit assumption of the Bayesian model of perceived timing: 
noisy measurements should lead to broader likelihood functions that are captured more by 
the prior probability distributions. In order to test this, we presented a sequence of stimuli 
with alternating amplitudes where the final stimulus could be earlier or later than expected. 
By reporting whether the final stimulus was before or after a visual probe, we were able to 
calculate the perceived timing of stimuli. Concurrent with the data from Chapters 2 and 3, 
we find a temporal regularization effect – stimuli presented earlier than expected are 
perceptually delayed whilst late stimuli are perceptually accelerated. Importantly, 
addressing the motivation of this experiment, we find that the temporal regularization 
effect is strongest for stimuli when the final stimulus was of weak amplitude. The data 
promotes the idea that temporal expectations are dynamically updated at every point in 
time and used to bias perception in a way that regularizes perception. 
5.2 Theoretical Implications and Contributions  
Throughout this thesis the main aim was to add a new focus to time perception research 
that aims at understanding how the brain may perceive the timing of events, rather than 
duration. We wanted to understand whether and how the Bayesian framework could be 
used to characterize how temporal expectations could be built rapidly and used to modify 
perceived timing. In this section, I will discuss how the results and models from Chapters 
2-4 impact the current theoretical accounts for the perception of time. Further, I will then 
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attempt to synthesize the findings and models into a broader theoretical framework for 
time perception.  
5.2.1 Impact to Contemporary Models of Time Perception 
The Bayesian model with asymmetric likelihood functions accurately captures the 
experimental data presented in the Experiments of Chapter 2. Previous timing models, for 
example interval-based and entrainment models of time perception, cannot account for the 
asymmetric patterns of results we observe. We show in Chapter 2 (Fig 2.1cd), that there is 
an asymmetry in temporal deviation detection: stimuli that are presented earlier than 
expected are better detected as off-time as the length of a sequence increases. Both interval 
and entrainment models predict a symmetric increase in temporal discrimination 
performance as the amount of stimuli in a sequence increases (Drake & Botte, 1993; ten 
Hoopen et al., 2011; Large & Jones, 1999; Large & Palmer, 2002). The Multiple-Look 
Model (MLM), an interval-based model of temporal discrimination, is based on the idea 
that as sequence length increases so does the precision of an estimate for each interval 
(Drake & Botte, 1993; Miller & McAuley, 2005). Similarly, the beat-averaging (Schulze, 
1978; 1989), diminishing returns (ten Hoopen et al., 2011) and internal-reference model 
(Bausenhart, Dyjas, & Ulrich, 2014; Dyjas, Bausenhart, & Ulrich, 2012; Ulrich, 1987), are 
all based on similar premises. As the factor of change in such accounts is the better 
internal representation of an interval, interval-based models make no predictions about 
changes in the perceived timing of stimuli (Gibbon, 1977; Gibbon et al., 1984; Shi et al., 
2013) – as stimuli simply delimit intervals1. 
A key interval-based model to explain such changes in representation 
mechanistically is SET (Gibbon et al., 1984). In this model, an internal pacemaker emits 
                                                1	  Our	  Bayesian	  model	  offers	  an	  alternative	  explanation,	  as	  temporal	  discrimination	  increases	  with	  sequence	  length	  through	  the	  increasing	  steepness	  of	  the	  posterior	  distribution	  resulting	  in	  greater	  temporal	  acuity	  (Li,	  Rhodes	  &	  Di	  Luca,	  In	  review;	  Rhodes,	  Li	  &	  Di	  Luca,	  In	  submission).	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pulses that are accumulated and counted between two events – leading to a duration 
estimate. In order to account for the modulations in perceived timing that we report in 
Chapter 2-4, the SET model must be augmented to account for the changes in perceived 
timing we observe. Rather than being in competition with SET, the model we present 
represents a general issue in resolving how ‘global’ context effects can be reconciled with 
‘local’ changes in perception – as it has been shown that the duration of just the previous 
stimulus can affect the perceived simultaneity of the next (Van der Burg et al., 2013); as 
well as the temporal regularization phenomena we report in this thesis. As such, a general 
model of time perception that both estimates perceived timing and duration is of 
paramount importance in order to reconcile such different ways of understanding how we 
perceive time.  
Entrainment models of temporal perception similarly predict symmetrical 
performance in determining if earlier or later-than expected are irregular with respect to 
expectation (Henry & Herrmann, 2014; Large & Jones, 1999; Large & Palmer, 2002). 
Entrainment models are based on the idea that the phase and frequency of temporal 
patterns adjust to rhythmic events– where at the neural level, recurrent activity patterns 
(Buonomano, 2009; Buonomano & Merzenich, 1995; Karmarkar & Buonomano, 2007; 
Laje & Buonomano, 2013) or phase coincidence (C. Miall, 1989) progressively tune to the 
frequency and phase of external stimulation. Though not originally formulated to predict 
changes in perceived timing, entrainment models could be formulated to appeal to the 
rhythmic deployment of attention at an expected time-point to facilitate the processing of 
on-time stimuli to be perceived faster (Rohenkohl et al., 2011). However, we find that 
early stimuli are delayed towards expectation (Figure 2.2) and as such, current 
formulations of entrainment models cannot account for this finding (Buonomano & 
Merzenich, 1995; Karmarkar & Buonomano, 2007; Large & Jones, 1999; Large & Palmer, 
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2002; Large & Snyder, 2009; C. Miall, 1989) – as principally these models are based on 
phase correction for the next stimulus in a sequence, and not modifications of a stimulus at 
the present time, whilst it is also unclear how such models could account for perceptual 
delay. Similar to the implication for interval-models, entrainment accounts of temporal 
processing should consider the modulation of PSS that results in temporal regularization. 
To summarize, the Bayesian model of perceived timing can explain the delay of 
early stimuli as well as the acceleration of on time and later than expected stimuli. Interval 
models do not make any predictions about changes in the perceived timing of stimuli and 
as such cannot account for our data, whilst entrainment accounts could be formulated to 
explain the acceleration of on time stimuli – however they cannot explain the delay 
towards expectation of early stimuli.  
5.2.2 Impact to Sensory Processing Theories 
Sensory processing involves three separate stages –  (1) detecting incoming information, 
(2) representing incoming information and (3) interpreting that representation. Two 
distinct accounts exist to explain these processes: the efficient coding hypothesis explains 
how limited neural resources lead to efficient representations that are optimized with 
regard to the natural statistics in the environment (Barlow, 1961; Lewicki, 2002; 
Simoncelli, 2003; Wei & Stocker, 2015). The role of primary sensory processing is, as 
such, to reduce the inefficiency and redundancy in representing a raw image by recoding a 
representation into an efficient form (Huang & Rao, 2011). However, in this hypothesis, it 
is hard to determine how perceptual biases may arise. Built on such a theoretical bases, the 
predictive coding hypothesis suggests sensory processing is the result of combining 
current sensory information with prior knowledge about the world (Friston & Kiebel, 
2009; Helmholtz, 1963; Kersten, Mamassian, & Yuille, 2004; Knill & Richards, 1996; Ma 
et al., 2006; Srinivasan, Laughlin, & Dubs, 1982) – according to Bayes’ (1763) rule. Such 
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an information-processing approach can explain the myriad of data that shows consistent 
perceptual biases (Ernst, 2006; Ernst & Banks, 2002; Knill & Richards, 1996; Körding & 
Wolpert, 2004; Mamassian et al., 2002; Petzschner et al., 2015; Wolpert & Ghahramani, 
2000). Recently, however, a unified model has been proposed that reconciles a predictive 
coding (Bayesian) approach with efficient coding of a sensory representation (Wei & 
Stocker, 2012; 2015), by constraining priors and likelihoods with natural stimulus 
statistics. 
 In this thesis, however, we too show how sensory information may be represented 
at the neural level – by constraining the likelihood function with the anisotropy of time. 
We introduce the idea that the likelihood function is necessarily asymmetric in the 
temporal dimension, with a steep onset and long-off tail (Chapter 2; Section 2.3.4). The 
asymmetric likelihood function explains how stimuli that are presented on time are 
perceptually accelerated – an anti-Bayesian effect. Interestingly, a recent article has shown 
concurrent repulsions away from the peak of the prior through similarly asymmetric 
likelihoods and priors (Wei & Stocker, 2012; 2015). The relaxation of the assumption of 
normality is thus of theoretical importance as up until now, probability distributions have 
been ubiquitously described as Gaussians in the Bayesian framework (Ernst, 2006; Ernst 
& Banks, 2002; Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010; Knill & Richards, 1996; Miyazaki et al., 2005; 
Sciutti et al., 2014; Shi et al., 2013). 
In Chapter 3, we report that the temporal context of an environment balances the 
tendency of the regularisation effect. We find in concert with the temporal regularisation 
effects found in Chapter 2 (Figure 2.2 and 4 (Figure 3.2) – however, we find no such 
temporal regularization effect in perfectly regularly-timed sequences when the sequence is 
embedded within an environment of mostly irregularly-timed sequences.  The results of 
Chapter 3 thus hint at the brain optimizing perception in order to process sensory 
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information more efficiently. Why regularize stimuli if most are actually irregular? 
Similarly, the exploitation of temporal regularities decreases neural metabolic 
consumption (VanRullen & Dubois, 2011). The predictable timing of future stimuli leads 
to improved stimulus discrimination and detection in a plethora of tasks (Brochard et al., 
2013; Carnevale et al., 2015; Correa et al., 2005; Cravo et al., 2013; Escoffier et al., 2010; 
Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010; Rohenkohl & Nobre, 2011), whilst the rhythmic entrainment of 
stimuli allows the automatizing of behaviour for activities such as dance, locomotion, 
speech, and music production (McNeill, 1995; Repp, 2005).  
 In Chapter 4 we further characterized how sensory processing may be affected by 
noisier measurements. We hypothesized that noisier signals should lead to shallower 
likelihood functions – and as such, be more captured by the prior compared to less noisy 
functions. This sort of effect has been found in the context of human speed perception, 
whereby a broader likelihood function results in speed estimates that are more dominated 
by the prior (Stocker & Simoncelli, 2006). As we have translated this type of effect into 
the domain of temporal perception – one could posit that this is applicable to other 
perceptual modalities and is, as such – perception-general. 
5.3 Critique 
From the three empirical Chapters presented in this thesis, I have strongly advocated the 
idea that the brain may be regularizing perceptual events. There is, however, still much 
cause for considering alternative interpretations of the data, as well as pointing out some 
facets of the model that may help increase clarity. In this next section, I will highlight such 
issues before moving onto discussing future directions of our work. 
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5.3.1 Psychophysical Interpretation 
The logic behind the Bayesian model of perceived timing with asymmetric distributions is 
due to the asymmetry of distortions in perceived timing evidenced by Experiment 2 in 
Chapter 2 (Figure 2.2). The possibility remains, however, that differential attentional 
processing to one modality over another may cloud such an asymmetry. The phenomenon 
of prior entry, for example, dictates that attended stimuli are processed quicker than 
unattended ones (Spence & Parise, 2010; Sternberg et al., 1971). If we consider this with 
regards to our experimental paradigms, one may posit that auditory and visual trials are 
differentially attended to, and thus have their own associated prior entry effects. It may be 
argued, therefore, that prior entry may cause a baseline shift in the data, such that what 
appears to be a crossover point of 40ms (Figure 2.2) may actually be at 0 – as prior entry 
shifts stimuli earlier in time by 20-40ms. This sort of interpretation may render the 
asymmetric model as needless; however, there is evidence that advocates an asymmetric 
Bayesian model. For instance, when we asked participants’ to perform simultaneity 
judgments (SJs) instead of temporal order judgements (Supplementary Figure 2.2), we find 
a crossover point that is positive. That is, the lines between auditory and visual sequences 
converge at around +40/80ms: in the opposite direction of the convergence point of 
Experiment 2 with temporal order judgments. The difference between audio and visual 
sequences with SJs thus evidences a generalised delay, in contrast to an effect such as prior 
entry that promotes the idea of perceptual acceleration. 
 We quantify the effect of delay and acceleration (for early and late stimuli 
respectively) by considering the difference in PSS estimates between sound and light 
sequences (Figure 2.2). However, in later Chapters (also Chapter 2, Experiments 3 and 4), 
we infer the effects of delay and acceleration by changes in PSS estimates across 
anisochronies in unimodal sequences (Figures 3.2 & 4.4). Given this inconsistency in 
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quantifying the effect, we highlight that the same pattern of results persists in Experiment 
2 (Chapter 2). If we consider the auditory (or visual) sequences alone in Figure 2.2, then 
we see the same changes in PSS as a function of the final stimulus’s anisochrony. Further, 
Experiment 2 was run with crossmodal sequences, and as such, has potentially higher 
noise in the measurements. Thus, comparing changes in perceived timing as a function of 
anisochrony within a sound (or light) sequence induces more risk of masking the BET 
effect. As such, we used a ‘crossmodal’ interpretation of these data to arrive at the 
conclusions we have expounded throughout this thesis. 
 One further issue to highlight, is that the TOJ task used in Experiment 2 is prone to 
decision-level biases based on the type of judgment being asked (Yarrow et al., 2011). 
Given that these response biases exist in the literature, it may be possible that participants 
differentially respond ‘sound’ or ‘light first’ to give rise to the pattern of results that we 
report. As our paradigm has not been used in the literature, further research should focus 
on how the type of task used to index changes in perceived timing changes the patterns of 
results found here. 
5.3.2 Model Interpretation 
The Bayesian model of perceived timing that we present throughout this thesis has an 
interesting inversion of the standard Bayesian framework (Kersten & Yuille, 2003; Knill 
& Richards, 1996). In the standard Bayesian inference model, the prior is modelled as the 
knowledge of the state of the world. The likelihood reflects the probability of sensing a 
stimulus given an external signal. Finally, the posterior probability reflects the probability 
of inferring the state of the world given sensory information. In our instantiation of a 
Bayesian model for time, however, the posterior and likelihood both reflect the probability 
of sensing a stimulus given the time a stimulus was presented. This interesting reversal of 
the posterior is caused by the inversion of the generative process used to give rise to the 
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likelihood functions used in our model (Chapter 2.3.4). Whilst the reversal of the posterior 
is in competition with the standard Bayesian framework, we point to the anisotropic nature 
of time as reason to why such a reversal may be reasonable. As time flows in one 
direction, one cannot sense the timing of an event before a stimulus is presented. Given 
this logic, we modelled the likelihood in such a way that allowed us generate a probability 
distribution that was in response to an external event.  
 A further issue to comment on is the framing of the model as changes in the low 
level processing of stimuli leading to perceptual delay or acceleration. The evidence for 
this sort of interpretation lies in oft-reported prior entry effects found in the literature 
(Spence & Parise, 2010; Sternberg et al., 1971), as well as in empirical work relating to the 
DAT theory of attentional entrainment. Both prior entry and DAT advocate that stimuli are 
processed faster if attended. However, our model may be viewed from the perspective of 
inference – rather than in changes in encoding. For example, it is entirely possible that a 
post-dictive estimation of the timing of an event happens sometime after the stimulus has 
been presented. Bayesian decision theory is inherently retrospective, thus in order to 
clarify whether the model we present is ‘on-line’ or post-dictive, future research could 
employ techniques to identify neurocorrelates of the model, and see if, for example, peaks 
of sensory registration change as a function of the anisochrony of the final stimulus of the 
sequence. 
 An alternative explanation of the BET effect that we report in Chapters 2-4 is to 
consider that subjects may learn to strategically allocate attention across time. In this way, 
as soon as the penultimate stimulus in a sequence offsets, a hazard function rises until the 
offset of the final stimulus in a sequence (Nobre, Correa, & Coull, 2007). As one can 
imagine, the effect of the hazard function would be smaller for early stimuli and stronger 
for later stimuli. If we further consider that if a prior entry style effects acts in concert with 
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a hazard function, then such an account may yield results similar to what we report in this 
thesis. That is, there is greater perceptual acceleration for stimuli the later they appear in 
time. However, if we consider this sort of interpretation further, there are a few issues that 
may be allayed by the BDT account. First, the hazard function has only been related to 
changes in motor preparation indexed by response times in humans (Nobre, Correa, & 
Coull, 2007) and monkeys (Janssen & Shadlen, 2005), and not changes in perception, as 
we present in our model. Second, we relate the prior as a mechanism to allocate attention 
at an expected time-point. In the hazard function approach, it is unclear how attention may 
be allocated to an expected time-point. Further experiments should elucidate if the hazard 
function could be used to describe changes in the perception of stimuli, rather than 
changes in motor preparation, as well as if the hazard function could be modified by 
temporal expectations.  
5.4 Directions for Future Research  
In order to continue to validate the proposed Bayesian model of perceived timing, the 
model must be tested and subsequently modified in order to reflect the findings of future 
work. In this section, I will make explicit predictions based on this model and from those 
formulate suggestions for future research.  
5.4.1 Predictions 
In this thesis, the main finding is that the perceived timing of stimuli is biased by dynamic 
prior expectations based on the iterative presentation of isochronous stimuli. As such, the 
characterization and limits of this finding require further investigation. I will now present 
some examples of how the model may be further explored.   
 To elicit the temporal regularization effect detailed in Chapters 2-4, I have 
presented sequences of isochronous events in order to build up prior expectations, yet in 
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the environment, sequences of repeated events are often not isochronous. In almost all 
forms of music around the world, there are rarely any instances of completely isochronous 
melodies – music has distinct and complex temporal patterns operating at different 
hierarchies and time signatures (Vuust & Witek, 2014). Syncopated rhythms, for example, 
carry expectations about the future timing of events – yet are not completely isochronous 
(Fitch & Rosenfeld, 2007). How can the brain predict such events in the context of the 
model we present – if it is based on the isochronous presentation of stimuli? The model, at 
present, would predict that a syncopated (as such), deviant stimulus would be biased 
towards the expected timing – yet it seems that when a stimulus is obviously earlier than 
expected – then we perceive it as such. To clarify this issue – we must first show the extent 
of the regularization effect over a whole range of anisochronies. One may predict that at a 
certain magnitude of anisochrony – the regularisation effect goes away. If this is the case, 
it may mean that a hierarchical prior takes over and modulates the tendency to regularize 
deviant stimuli. Further, one could also imagine another prior that is based on the rhythm 
and syncopation of a sequence, which also influences the lower-level regularisation and as 
such, the combination of the prior and likelihood. 
 Given that the prior is built after the presentation of isochronous events, sometimes 
events may not be sensed or not even occur. In the active sensing framework, entrained 
oscillations continue to be in phase consistency after the end of the external stimulation – 
yet decay after some time (Lakatos et al., 2008; 2005; Schroeder & Lakatos, 2009). In the 
same way, does the prior decay after time or does it stop influencing the moment a beat is 
missed? To test this, one could think of an experiment where the final stimulus is missed 
and presented at T+1, T+2, T+3 etc. where T is the timing the final stimulus. If the prior is 
still present (yet decayed) it should still modulate perceived timing – but the effect should 
diminish as the missed beats increases. 
 117 
 Moving away from the perception of audio or visual stimuli – the model could be 
extended to the realm of motor control. It has been consistently shown that humans 
synchronize to sensorimotor events such as finger tapping or dancing (Elliott et al., 2014; 
Elliott, Welchman, & Wing, 2009; Elliott, Wing, & Welchman, 2010; Repp, 1999; 2005; 
Repp & Su, 2013). A consistent finding in such studies is that the time of a tap (i.e. the 
time at which a finger touches a surface) is prior to the onset of an isochronous 
metronome. The model could account for such a negative error as it predicts that the 
perception of isochronous events is actually perceived earlier than expectation resulting in 
earlier taps. Further, how should an observer know when to initiate a tap? Due to the build 
of temporal expectations via the stimulation of a metronome observers can anticipate the 
timing of future taps and use this information to initiate a movement.  
5.4.2 A Unified Model of Time Perception? 
What should a unified model of time perception look like? A great deal of literature has 
been dedicated to the perception of time – and in particular, interval timing (Creelman, 
1962; Gibbon et al., 1984; Matell & Meck, 2004; Meck, 2005; Merchant & de Lafuente, 
2014; Treisman, 1963). The perception of duration has been described mechanistically 
with the SET model – though, recently it has been tied to thalamo-cortico-striatal circuitry 
(Matell & Meck, 2004). Contextual calibration effects on perceived duration have been 
modelled in the Bayesian framework  – whereby duration estimates are biased towards the 
mean of previously experienced intervals (Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010; Miyazaki et al., 
2006; Shi et al., 2013). Context effects are bound by the fact they take a long course to 
learn the temporal statistics of the environment (Acerbi et al., 2012). The motivation for 
this thesis, however, was in re-focusing temporal perception from the duration dimension 
to perceived timing – as well as showing how the perception of time can be biased rapidly 
within just a single trial. Therefore, future work should seek to link together the existing 
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frameworks for perceived duration and perceived timing. As both perceived timing 
(Chapter 2-4) and contextual calibration of perceived duration (Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010; 
Miyazaki et al., 2006; Shi et al., 2013) have been described in the Bayesian framework, a 
neural model of Bayesian inference to explain both perceived duration and timing could 
lead to a unified and neurophysiologically plausible account of time perception.  
There are several theories of how the brain may represent probability distributions 
(Beck et al., 2008; Deneve, Latham, & Pouget, 1999; Fiser, Berkes, Orbán, & Lengyel, 
2010; Hoyer & Hyvarinen, 2003; Pouget, Dayan, & Zemel, 2000; Zemel, Dayan, & 
Pouget, 1998). Whilst ultimately a computational framework to explain how prior 
expectations can be combined with current sensory evidence to arrive at a best estimate to 
the state of the world, Bayesian inference has been shown to operate at the neural level 
through probabilistic population coding (Ma et al., 2006). A whole raft of psychophysical 
experiments shows that humans perform to near Bayes-optimal inference (Beierholm, 
Quartz, & Shams, 2009; Ernst, 2006; Ernst & Banks, 2002; Kersten & Yuille, 2003; Knill 
& Richards, 1996; Körding & Wolpert, 2004; Ma et al., 2006; Petzschner & Glasauer, 
2011; Shi et al., 2013; Stocker & Simoncelli, 2006; Vilares & Körding, 2011), but in this 
thesis we describe for the first time how subjects use Bayesian inference in the domain of 
perceived timing. 
 In order to translate our model to the neural level, we must first consider that our 
model is not in competition with interval-based accounts of time perception (Creelman, 
1962; Gibbon et al., 1984; Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010; Petzschner et al., 2015; Shi et al., 
2013; Treisman, 1963) – but rather, our model should be synthesized with such models in 
order to arrive at a general model of time perception. A Bayesian neural inference model 
that is hierarchically organized such that at a low level population codes encode the 
perceived timing of stimuli but then feed-forward to a higher level that encodes the 
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duration between two stimuli may offer a way of harmonizing perceived duration and 
perceived timing. 
5.5 Conclusions 
During the last 150 years, great steps have been made in understanding how the human 
brain may perceive time. The advent of the psychophysical approach to studying 
perception has allowed researchers to precisely measure temporal properties of stimuli and 
as such, a large body of research has sought to understand the mechanisms underpinning 
temporal-perceptual phenomena. Contemporary models of time perception consider 
temporal processing from the perspective of duration. In this thesis, I have tried to add a 
new focus to time perception research away from the duration dimension towards an 
event-based approach. A Bayesian model of perceived timing re-focuses temporal 
perception research towards an event-based outlook. The model sets the scene to unify 
temporal processing accounts at neural, computational and behavioural levels, with the 
future goal of leading to a general model of time perception that is neurobiologically 
plausible and grounded in computational principles. 
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